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Abstract 
 
Carolyn Kanagy:  Field Independence, Somatic Awareness, Autonomic Arousal, and 
Emotion Differentiation as Predictors of Emotion Regulation 
(Under the direction of Laura M. Clark, Ph.D.) 
 
 A thread of the growing literature on emotion and emotion regulation aims at 
understanding the psychological processes an individual uses to regulate emotion, and at 
identifying what characteristics and abilities are conducive to efficient emotion 
regulation.  These studies have produced a growing list of emotion regulation correlates 
suggesting that a quality of self-awareness, the tendency to be attentive to self rather than 
surroundings, the ability to understand one’s feelings precisely, and recently the very 
specific ability to put exact words to one’s feelings are all positive predictors of emotion 
regulation. 
 This study investigated whether the qualities described by earlier emotion 
regulation models were, in fact, related to the construct of field independence, a cognitive 
processing style characterized by the ability to separate and categorize information.  We 
hypothesized that this style might result in an increased ability to describe sensations of 
autonomic arousal which would in turn predict more precise descriptions of emotional 
states.  We hypothesized that this ability to differentiate emotional states would lead to 
improved overall emotion regulation as well as some of its subcomponents.  In addition, 
we were interested in whether baseline body awareness was related to autonomic arousal 
and emotion regulation. 
 iii 
 The hypothesized mediational model was not supported; because our measure of 
autonomic arousal assessed overall intensity rather than differentiation of symptoms, the 
data could not adequately test the overall model.  However, both baseline body awareness 
and field independence were found to independently predict improved overall emotion 
regulation and/or some of its subcomponents.  
 The relationship between field independence and emotion regulation led us to 
examine the literature on executive attention which we discuss in the context of field 
independence.  In addition, we discuss the implications of meditative practice on both 
constructs.  Our results suggest that there may be multiple routes to emotion regulation. 
 Future directions might include a cross-sectional comparison of multiple 
components of attention with field dependence/independence and with emotion 
regulation in adults.  In addition, functional neuroimaging studies comparing field 
independence and components of attention would be of interest.   
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Introduction 
 
Overview 
 This study focuses on the relationship between field independence and the ability 
to regulate emotion.  The inspiration for the project came from a clinical observation that 
clients enrolled in a Dialectical Behavioral Therapy (DBT) (Linehan, 1993) skills training 
group, all of whom experienced deficits in emotion regulation, reported little or no 
somatic awareness, or how their bodies “feel” (Moorhead, personal communication, 
2005).  The suggested relationship between body awareness and emotion regulation 
prompted interest in developing a somatic therapy.  Examination of the emotion 
regulation literature provided clues that the absence of somatic awareness might be 
indicative of a style or type of approach to emotion regulation.  The current study is 
designed to provide background for such an intervention by establishing a cross-sectional 
relationship between this “style” and emotion regulation.  Supporting information will 
include some review of the early literature describing emotion in terms of physiological 
processes, the resulting divergent trains of thought that generated much of emotion 
research in the 20th century, and the more contemporary thinking on emotion and emotion 
regulation.  Finally, the recent studies on emotion awareness and emotion differentiation 
that inspired the current hypotheses are reviewed.   
Background and Significance 
Early history of emotion as a biological phenomenon.  Modern interest in the 
physiology of emotion began with the ideas of William James in his publication of 
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Principles of Psychology (1890/1981). James postulated, in his “peripheral theory,” that 
bodily changes occur in response to stimuli, and that the experience of these changes as 
they occur constitute the emotion.  James further believed that the experience of emotion 
goes no further than this initial experience and that there are no brain centers or circuits 
other than the sensory and motor cortical areas specifically involved in the experience of 
emotion.  His original theory was modified by his colleague, Carl Lange (1885), who 
provided detailed descriptions of the physiological changes accompanying what he 
considered to be the four basic emotions:  happiness, sadness, anger, and fear.  Lange 
proposed that two kinds of phenomena accompany all emotion reactions; muscular 
enervation and vasomotor phenomena, and provided a description of the specific changes 
in each that occurred with each emotion. 
The theory of James and Lange was challenged by Walter Cannon (1927) who 
questioned the idea that emotion is not processed neurologically; he suggested that 
physiological response, in particular visceral response, was too slow and insensitive to 
account for an individual’s perception of emotion.  Experiments by Cannon and Bard 
(Bard, 1928, 1929) in which a disinhibition syndrome was observed in animals with 
cortical lesions, strengthened their argument for a neural circuitry underlying these 
“sham” emotional responses.   
Although interest in the James-Lange theory and in Cannon and Bard’s work was 
not revived until the 1950s, their ideas about emotion-specific physiological responses 
and specific neural circuits involved in the processing of emotion have been driving 
forces in the field of research on emotion in the 20th century.  The search for specificity 
of physiological responses spawned numerous studies in which measurements of heart 
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rate, respiration, and galvanic skin response were monitored under conditions designed to 
generate emotional response.  Initial studies suggested some specificity for negative 
emotions such as fear and anger (Ax, 1953; Schachter, 1957). Since these earliest 
measurements much research energy has been focused on describing autonomic nervous 
system (ANS) specificity, particularly for negative emotions.  Overall, there is good 
evidence for some specificity in cardiovascular changes; for example, heart rate 
acceleration is associated with anger (Frijda, 1986; Roberts & Weerts, 1982), fear ( 
Bugental & Cortez, 1988; Waters et al, 1989), and sadness (Schwartz et al., 1981), but 
disgust is associated with heart rate deceleration (Hare et al., 1971; Klorman & Ryan, 
1980).  Peripheral vascular differences have also been recorded; although both fear and 
anger are associated with increase in skin temperature and diastolic blood pressure, the 
increases are consistently smaller for fear than for anger (Graham, 1962; Roberts & 
Weerts, 1982; Schwartz et al., 1981).   
Despite these apparent overall trends, Lacey et al. (Lacey et al., 1953; Lacey & 
Lacey, 1958) found physiological patterns to be more characteristic of an individual than 
between two people.  Furthermore, ANS patterns during fear, anger, and sadness appear 
to differ depending on the source used to induce the emotion; real-life fear generated by 
reading Poe’s “The Fall of the House of Usher” in a darkened room produced a 
statistically different autonomic profile than did a task in which subjects were asked to 
speak about a frightening personal event (Stemmler, 1989).  Finally, no systematic, 
replicable differences that distinguish between positive and negative affect have been 
reported (Watson et al., 1999; Lang, 1995). For example, happiness produces heart rate 
acceleration and increased skin conductance increase which are similar in direction but 
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smaller in amplitude than the changes seen in fear (Levenson et al, 1990), and increase in 
finger temperature which is much smaller in amplitude to that observed in anger (Ekman 
et al., 1983).  ANS response to positive emotion has been traditionally difficult to detect 
under laboratory conditions, largely because positive emotion is difficult to generate.  For 
this reason, most laboratory study has focused on negative emotion.  General consensus 
is that there exists some emotion specificity in ANS response, although differences of 
opinion about the magnitude continue to exist (Davidson et al., 2000).  Levenson (1992), 
a champion of the concept of ANS specificity, pointed out that ANS specificity does not 
require demonstrating that every emotion has a unique “ANS signature,” but only that 
some emotions differ from others in consistent ways. 
The difficulty in reproducing reported physiological responses between 
individuals led to an interest in the perception of bodily change.  Measures were 
developed in which a subject was asked to describe in some detail the levels of a wide 
range of physiological changes during the experience of a given emotion (Malmo et al., 
1950; Mandler & Kremen, 1958; Mandler et al., 1958).  These studies focused on 
personal awareness of physiological activity, and attempted to correlate these perceptions 
with actual physiological measurements of arousal.  Their results suggested that 
individuals with higher levels of autonomic response, generally heart rate and galvanic 
skin response, tended to be more aware of physiological change.  These results have not 
been reproduced consistently. The question of whether greater reported physiological 
response was due to a lower feedback threshold for this physiological activity or to 
cognitive factors leading to an increase in awareness of change raised some of the first 
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questions about the validity of self-report, and a concern with what was being measured 
during these experiments (Shields & Stern, 1979).   
The difficulty inherent in studying emotional responses may also relate to factors 
other than differences in physiological perception.  For example, a given stimulus may 
not elicit the same emotional memory (therefore physiological response) in two subjects 
(Sutton et al., 1997).   Even the use of emotion words is acknowledged to be problematic 
since a given word may have different meanings for different individuals (Davidson & 
van Reekum, 2005; Kagan et al., 1988; Lang et al., 1993).   Sometimes misreporting 
occurs for reasons unrelated to the use of emotion words or physical perceptions; for 
example, distortions in retrospective affective evaluations are common.  Two studies 
showed that individuals who were asked how nervous they had been during the past 
month were likely to place more emphasis on information about a peak episode of 
nervousness rather than to consider the entire period. (Kahneman 1999; Schwarz & 
Strack, 1999).   Finally, Davidson (2004 ) points out that the assumption that emotions 
are conscious feeling states is likely to be erroneous, and that like all human mental 
processes, emotions are likely to be only partially accessible to conscious awareness.    
The study of ANS arousal, whether by physiological measurement or self-report 
measure, continues to be subject to ambiguity, and the search for assessment measures 
and methods for generating emotional response in a laboratory has generated a large 
literature.  Because there are no methods available for the direct physical measurement of 
perception of physical sensation or for perception of emotional processes, research 
continues to rely at least partially on self-report.  Two measures were recently developed 
that involve clinician inference based on subject performance or clinical interview; the 
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Levels of Emotional Awareness Scales (Lane et al, 1990) and the Affect Regulation and 
Experience Q-Sort (Westen et al., 1997).  Although time-consuming and with potentially 
limited reliability, these instruments suggest that efforts are being made to resolve the 
self-report-of-emotion problem. The choice of measures is a source of concern in all 
studies of emotion including the present study; these concerns will be specifically 
addressed below. 
The contemporary line of research on physiological feedback in emotion that 
most resembles James’s original theory is the self-perception theory of Bem (1972), who 
hypothesized that feelings are generated in response to emotional behaviors.  Bem 
suggested that we observe our own behaviors as does an outsider, and must thus “infer” 
our feelings from these behaviors.  Early studies by Laird (1974, 1967) demonstrating 
induced feelings of happiness and anger in response to manipulated facial expressions are 
consistent with Bem’s model; since that time, numerous studies have been published in 
which emotional states have been induced by manipulations of expressive behaviors such 
as facial expressions (Duclos & Laird, 2001; Levenson et al., 1990), postures (Flack et 
al., 1999) , patterns of gaze (Williams & Kleinke, 1993), tone of voice (Hatfield et al., 
1995; Siegman & Boyle, 1993), gestural movements (Brinol & Petty, 2003; Forster & 
Strack, 1998), and breathing patterns ( Philippot et al., 2002).   Manipulation of emotion 
has additionally been achieved by suppression of expressive behavior (Laird et al, 1994), 
although this technique sometimes has the effect of moderating only physiological 
responses like heart rate and skin conductance (Gross, 1998; Gross & Levenson, 1993).   
Although these studies give evidence that feedback from certain body poses 
causes autonomic change, Ekman (1992) contends that this autonomic response likely 
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comes from neural circuitry receiving efferents from the facial muscles and should not be 
considered an emotion-specific response from the peripheral nervous system.  The 
current thinking expressed by some, but not all, researchers on the subject of behavioral 
feedback is that differentiation of emotions likely takes place largely in central neural 
circuitry, although peripheral feedback may have a role in modulating emotional intensity 
(Cacioppo et al.,1993; LeDoux, 1994; Leventhal & Tomarken, 1986).    
Neural circuitry underlying emotion.  During the search for autonomic specificity 
of emotions, the famous studies by Schachter and Singer (1962) introduced the concept 
of cognitive appraisal.  The authors demonstrated that the physiological changes 
produced by injections of norepinephrine produced different emotions, depending on 
what information the individual subjects had prior to the injections.  The authors 
generalized these results to conclude that initial physiological reactions were nonspecific 
and that cognitive appraisal of a given situation was responsible for the specificity of 
emotional response.  Although the studies were shown to be flawed, the concept of 
cognitive appraisal as a component of emotion became incorporated into mainstream 
thinking.    
Affective neuroscience, describing the relationship between specific areas of the 
brain and emotion, has developed rapidly during the past 30 years.  The field has 
produced a model of a neural circuit that explains the cognitive appraisal described by 
Schachter and Singer as a component in the modulation of physiological response.  
Critical components of this circuit are areas of the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala.  
 Although the role of the amygdala was first thought to be in the establishment of 
conditioned fear, recent evidence suggests its involvement in recognition of facial 
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expressions of fear (Adolphs et al., 1995, 1996, 1998; Broks et al., 1998), recognition of 
vocal fear and anger (Scott et al., 1997), aversive gustatory and olfactory stimuli (Zald et 
al., 1997, 1998), and response to unconscious exposure to fearful face masks (Whalen, 
Rauch, et al., 1998).  The amygdala is currently believed to automatically initiate 
physiological arousal in response to stimuli that evoke previously learned negative affect 
(Davis, 1992; Kesner, 1992).  For example, studies in rats have shown that when auditory 
information associated with being shocked is delivered via the thalamus to the amygdala, 
an immediate conditioned fear response is initiated.  This response occurs when 
projections from the amygdala to the hypothalamus and brain stem stimulate subsequent 
autonomic arousal (Petrovich et al.,1996; Savander et al., 1995).  Tucker et al. (2000) 
also provided evidence that the amygdala functions to increase allocation of attention to 
external stimuli, and is instrumental in modulating sensory systems for processing 
incoming sensory information.  Finally, rapid habituation of the amygdala’s response to 
aversive stimuli suggests that its function in the processing of emotion is time limited 
(Breier et al., 1996).  Given that the bulk of data on the amygdala has been concerned 
with negative emotion, the question remains whether it is involved in the processing of 
all emotion, or just negative affect.   
Direct evidence for involvement of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) in emotion 
processing was observed initially in rats with medial prefrontal lesions.  These animals 
showed dramatically slower extinction of a learned aversive response compared with 
controls (Morgan et al., 1993).  The authors of this study inferred a descending pathway 
between the medial PFC and the amygdala that is inhibitory and represents a component 
of extinction.  In the absence of this inhibitory input, Morgan et al. postulated that the 
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amygdala remains active and that stimulus of the autonomic nervous system continues.  
 The composition of the PFC/amygdala circuit have been studied extensively since 
Morgan’s first observations (see, for example, Miller & Cohen, 2001).  Briefly, for the 
purposes of this study, the circuitry suggests that the following train of events may 
resemble the initiation and moderation, in keeping with the appraisal model, of the 
physiological response of a given emotion.  Sensory perception of an initial stimulus, 
arriving via the thalamus at the amygdala, is interpreted based on earlier aversive 
conditioning.  An initial physiological response is generated from the amygdala via the 
brainstem and hypothalamus which results in autonomic stimulation.  This is a 
subconscious process.  Cognitive appraisal of the context of the stimulus results in 
efferent signal from the PFC to the amygdala which serves to modulate the amygdalar 
signal generating arousal.  This modulated signal then results in the pattern of autonomic 
response characteristic of the given emotion (Ohira, 2004).   
The prefrontal/amygdalar circuit has been studied extensively during the past two 
decades and is now believed to consist of two partially separable circuits which likely 
moderate positive and negative affect respectively.  This hypothesis stems from early 
studies of patients with unilateral prefrontal cortical damage that indicated a relationship 
between incidence of depressive symptoms and left-sided damage (Morris et al, 1996; 
Robinson et al., 1984). The interpretation of this data was that depressive symptoms are 
increased upon left prefrontal damage because this area participates in a circuit involved 
in positive affect, and diminished capacity to experience positive affect is considered to 
be a hallmark feature of depression (Watson et al, 1995).   This concept was tested 
initially by Davidson et al. (1990) who demonstrated that laboratory-induced disgust and 
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fear increase relative right-sided prefrontal and anterior temporal EEG activation, 
whereas induced positive affect produces an opposite (left-sided) pattern of asymmetric 
activation.  Similar results for generation of negative affect have been observed by others 
(Ahern & Schwartz, 1985; Tucker, 1981).    
Stronger forms of negative affect have been induced in clinically anxious patients 
by presenting them with specific types of stimuli known to provoke their anxiety.  
Davidson et al. (2000) produced large increases in right-sided anterior EEG activation in 
social phobics who anticipated making public speeches, and Rauch et al. (1997) reported 
on the use of Positive Emission Tomography (PET) to observe similar right-sided 
increases among provoked subjects with a variety of anxiety diagnoses.  Although 
Davidson et al. (1990) reported a relationship between induced positive affect and 
relative left-sided prefrontal activation (above), less evidence is generally available on the 
subject of positive relative to negative affect.  This is attributed both to the 
aforementioned difficulty of eliciting positive emotion in the laboratory, and to 
“negativity bias,” the general tendency for organisms to react more strongly to negative 
than positive stimuli (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Taylor, 1991).   
The differences in EEG signal level between left and right hemispheres have also 
been found to relate to affective style.  Tomarken et al (1992) found that EEG activation 
asymmetry patterns in adults are stable over time.  Large individual differences in the 
magnitude and direction of baseline asymmetric activation in EEG activity were observed 
in both infants (Davidson & Fox, 1989) and adults (Davidson & Tomarken, 1989.)  In 
adults, these differences in symmetry have been found to predict dispositional mood 
(Tomarken et al., 1992), self-report measures of behavioral inhibition (Sutton & 
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Davidson, 1997), repressive defensiveness (Tomarken & Davidson, 1994), reactivity to 
positive and negative emotion elicitors (Wheeler et al., 1993), baseline immune function 
(Kang et al, 1991),  reactivity of the immune system to emotional challenge (Davidson & 
Rickman,  1999), and the magnitude of recovery following a negative affective stimulus 
(Larson et al., 1998).  This last result has generated much interest, with the speculation 
that left prefrontal activation may result in inhibition of the amygdala; thus reducing 
overall affective reactivity (Davidson, Marshall et al., 2000).   
This wide array of behavioral characteristics predicted by patterns of asymmetry, 
coupled with their temporal stability, suggests that many of these behavioral patterns 
might be traitlike and resistant to change.  This presents challenges to the development of 
interventions related to regulation of mood and affect.  Thinking anatomically, one might 
wonder where in these circuits there exists the plasticity necessary for change.  Recent 
evidence of molecular modifications to the amygdala with acquired aversive learning 
suggest that this is a site of potential change (Schafe et al., 1999; Weisskopf & LeDoux, 
1999.)  However, the study of plasticity in emotion regulation has been confined largely 
to animals and has focused on early development.  One study, described in some detail 
below, (Davidson et al., 2003), has demonstrated a mindfulness training intervention that 
appears to produce change in prefrontal asymmetry; this suggests that the prefrontal area 
is also a site of plasticity and that other therapies aimed at such modifications might be 
possible.  
Psychological approaches to emotion and emotion regulation.   Concurrently 
with the physiological approach to emotion and its regulation has been the development 
of psychological perspectives.  Modern theories on emotion regulation began with 
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Freud’s concept of defenses against anxiety and included such techniques as avoidance 
and suppression of impulses (Freud, 1926/1959).  Treatment consisted of learning new 
ways to regulate anxiety through corrective experiences in which the feared 
consequences of impulse expression do not materialize (Basch, 1976).  In contrast to this 
early psychodynamic perspective, the first cognitive approach was the stress and coping 
tradition which introduced the concepts of primary appraisal (of the stressor), secondary 
appraisal (of the capacity to respond) and response (coping) (Selye 1956, 1973).  
Ultimately, distinctions were made between types of stressors and types of coping 
responses such as “problem-focused coping,” aimed at solving problems, and “emotion-
focused coping,” aimed at lessening negative emotion experience (Folkman & Lazarus, 
1985). 
The present study utilizes components of the physiological approach to emotion 
regulation described earlier as well as more contemporary perspectives, which are 
reviewed briefly here.  The current literature on emotion distinguishes between emotion, 
emotion regulation, affect, mood, and stress responses.  The definition of emotion used 
here is that it serves to coordinate diverse response systems, and to help individuals 
respond to important challenges or opportunities (Levenson, 1994).  The example often 
cited is fear; with the experience of fear, muscles are primed, senses are sharpened, and 
the cardiovascular system provides increased oxygen and energy.  General characteristics 
of an emotional experience are that it is short-lived and entails changes in subjective 
experience, expressive behavior, and central, autonomic, and endocrine response systems 
(Lang, 1995). Emotion is distinguished from mood (periods of longer duration) (Scherer, 
1984), and the terms “affect” and “emotion” are often used interchangeably, as they will 
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be here.  Finally, a recent but widely used model of emotion describes it as being two-
dimensional in that its subjective experience includes valence (pleasantness or hedonic 
value; i.e. how good or bad) and arousal ( specific bodily activation) (Barrett., 1998).   
 Interest in the subject of emotion regulation deficit has multiple sources; emotion 
dysregulation has been implicated in most Axis II disorders (Gross & Munoz, 1995), 
substance abuse (Hayes et al., 1996), generalized anxiety disorder (Mennin et al., 2002), 
and post traumatic stress disorder (Cloitre, 1998). However, the work of Linehan (1993) 
describing emotion dysregulation as underlying the development of borderline 
personality disorder has provided the most comprehensive understanding of the 
phenomenon.  Her descriptions of the self-destructive behaviors adopted by individuals 
attempting to regulate their emotions has been empirically validated (Briere & Gil, 1998; 
Gratz, 2003) and has made clear both the seriousness of the problem, and the extent to 
which it extends beyond the realm of persons with borderline personality disorder.   
Although, as described above, earlier attitudes towards emotion regulation 
focused largely on the control of negative feelings, emotions regulation is now loosely 
defined as a conscious or unconscious attempt to modulate the subjective experience of 
emotion (Cortez & Bugental, 1994; Garner & Spears, 2000; Zeman & Garber, 1996).  A 
still broader approach suggests that emotion regulation is not synonymous with emotional 
control and that it properly involves the ability to experience and differentiate a range of 
emotions, to understand and evaluate them, and to respond appropriately (Cole et al., 
1994; Pavio & Greenberg, 1998; Thompson, 1994).  Two recent studies demonstrated 
that regulating emotion by control of experience (avoidance) and suppression of 
expression, correlate with increased likelihood of psychological disorder (Hayes et al, 
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1996; Stewart et al., 2002).  Gross & Levenson (1997) demonstrated that instructions to 
constrict or conceal expression of emotion increased physiological arousal.  These and 
other results suggest that attempts to control without accepting or understanding emotions 
may be detrimental to the process of regulation (Linehan, 1993; Cole et al, 1994).  
Futhermore, adaptive regulation is considered by some to involve modulating an emotion 
rather than eliminating it; the goal then becomes reduced arousal such that behaviors can 
be controlled in the presence of negative emotions (Linehan, 1993; Melnick & Hinshaw, 
2000).  
A recently-developed assessment tool that reflects this current thinking of 
emotion regulation as a complex and largely conscious process is the Difficulties in 
Emotion Regulation Scales (DERS) (Gratz & Roemer, 2004).  The measure was initially 
developed for use with patients diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder in order 
to describe the complexities of their deficits in emotion regulaton.  Factor analysis of the 
measure has identified six subscales: (1) Nonacceptance of emotional responses, (2) 
Difficulties engaging in goal-directed behavior, (3) Impulse control difficulties, (4) Lack 
of emotional awareness, (5) Limited access to emotion regulation, and (6) Lack of 
emotional clarity.   Dysregulation is conceptualized here as a multi-faceted process, and 
the suggestion is that emotion regulation difficulties may occur for a number of reasons.  
Examination of individual items suggests that some subscales (1 and 5) relate largely to 
cognitive appraisal or cognitive style, another (6) may relate significantly to awareness of 
physiological arousal, and some (2, 3, and 4) may relate to both. This represents a 
departure from earlier measures that examined more traditional subconscious defenses or, 
alternatively, the suppression of negative affect. 
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Using a slightly different model, Gross’s 1998 review of contemporary work on 
emotion lists five methods by which an emotion may be consciously regulated:  (1) prior 
to an eliciting event, i.e. situational selection, (2) situational modification; analogous to 
solution-focused problem solving, (3) attentional deployment, seeking to redirect 
attention in the face of an emotion-arousing stimulus, (4) cognitive reappraisal, described 
earlier as reassessment of the situation based on information available, and (5) response 
modulation or influencing emotion response tendencies once they arise.  Cognitive 
therapies work at helping individuals learn to reappraise situations in order to reduce 
emotion intensity; behavioral therapies teach individuals to choose their situations 
differently, change situations that generate negative emotion, and reduce the intensity of 
already-generated emotions with a variety of physiological techniques.     
This study focuses on an aspect not addressed by Gross but which is engaged by 
the Gratz & Roemer measure; that is, the possibility of modification of the specific 
awareness of physiological arousal.  We assume that identification and labeling of an 
emotion based on its physiological arousal pattern is not a given, that this is in fact a 
variable that affects an individual’s ability to identify his emotion, and that it is subject to 
individual differences.  It is our belief that awareness of autonomic arousal, and the 
ability to differentiate states of autonomic arousal are essential for the accurate perception 
of emotion, and that a more accurate perception of emotion informs the conscious 
emotion regulation process.  The individual components of the pathway between 
autonomic arousal and emotion regulation are described in the literature and discussed 
below.  We will propose that an additional variable be involved in the sequence, 
specifically that the cognitive dimension of field dependence/independence is a factor 
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affecting the awareness of emotional states, and is thus related to some of the conscious 
processes of emotion regulation.  Because our interest is in a sequence of variables, 
progressing from field independence through emotion awareness to emotion regulation, 
the current state of thinking on these individual components is briefly reviewed here. 
Somatic awareness and emotion.   Although there exists an extensive literature on 
somatic sensitivity in some anxiety disorders (e.g., Fergusen et al., 2006; Hoehn-Saric et 
al., 2004; Lenze et al., 2005), and somatic sensitivity relative to pain and symptom 
reporting, the relationship of general somatic awareness to emotion and emotion 
regulation has received relatively less attention.  A search of the current literature for 
measures of somatic awareness produces studies of “objective” body awareness, that is, 
perception of how one’s body might be perceived by others or, alternatively, satisfaction 
with one’s own body (Lindberg et al., 2006; McKinley & Hyde, 2006; Pingitore et al., 
1997).  This literature has doubtless appeared in response to the vast increase in the cases 
of eating disorder during the past two decades.  However, in the study of somatic 
awareness and emotion, there has been little in the way of development of new measures 
for their assessment.  
A few studies, however, have examined the relationship between resting body 
awareness, and body awareness during emotional arousal.  Shields and Simon (1991) 
examined the relationship between self-report of somatic arousal during emotion and 
self-report of somatic awareness during non-emotional states.  Perception of arousal 
within a given individual correlated more highly between different emotional states than 
between any emotional state and the nonemotional, resting state.  Although non-
emotional body awareness correlated positively with somatic awareness during emotion 
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change, the correlation was small, and the authors speculated that another factor was 
involved during emotional arousal.  Pennebaker and Epstein (1983) observed low 
concordance between attentiveness to low levels of physiological arousal and to high 
levels of arousal during emotion.  Blaskovich and Katkin (1983) similarly found little 
relationship between awareness of physiological emotional arousal and detection of body 
symptoms in a nonemotional state; these authors concluded that self-reported 
physiological arousal accompanying emotion is colored by beliefs about the symptoms 
and the emotion itself.  Pennebaker and Skelton (1981), in an experiment in which 
subjects were given suggestions about what sensations to expect, found that individuals 
selectively encode some internal sensations and filter out others consistent with their 
hypotheses.  The authors point out that selective filtering of external stimuli has been 
demonstrated as well and that these results lend credence to the idea that self-report of 
physiological emotional arousal may have limited reliability.  Thus although the 
relationship between body cues and emotion has been established, the above results 
suggest that body awareness during emotional arousal differs from baseline body 
awareness, or that other, unidentified factors may be involved.   
Recent research has focused less on somatic awareness and more on other 
properties of emotional arousal.  A hypothesis which has received much support is that 
the ability to differentiate emotions, that is, to precisely distinguish one emotion from 
another, is essential for some aspects of conscious emotion regulation.  Sources of 
emotion differentiation have been addressed in the recent literature.  
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Emotion differentiation and emotion regulation.  Emotion differentiation is 
defined as the ability to clearly distinguish one emotion from another; to be able to 
recognize and state one’s feelings precisely.  The extent to which one generally 
differentiates between emotions is considered to be a traitlike quality with wide 
individual variability.  For example, in repeated measures studies of individuals’ reports 
of affective experiences, some subjects consistently show low correlations between such 
negative emotions as sadness, anger, and apprehension, suggesting that they perceive 
them differently.   At the other extreme is the subject who describes his feelings in a 
nearly undifferentiated manner along a positive/negative continuum, stating, for example, 
that he feels “just awful”.  Even within a given individual, increased emotional intensity 
is associated with less emotion differentiation (Feldman Barrett et al., 2001).  Individuals 
who show high levels of emotion differentiation tend also to have more information 
about their emotions; specifically, they are more likely to be aware of the cause, context, 
physiological symptoms, and potential means of regulation of an individual emotion than 
an individual with a lower level of differentiation (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983; Shweder, 1993).  Conversely, undifferentiated feelings assigned only a 
valence (positive or negative) and intensity provide the individual with little information 
about how best to deal with the emotion and the circumstances causing it (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983, 1996).    
 Studies of mood differentiation are limited but informative.  Swinkels & Giuliano 
(1995) studied individuals they called “mood labelers” those individuals more able to 
precisely define their moods, and “mood monitors” those individuals more likely to 
monitor the intensity of their moods.  They found that mood labelers tended to seek and 
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like social support, were more likely to be extraverts, to experience positive affect, had 
higher levels of self-esteem, experienced diminished social anxiety, and reported more 
life satisfaction.  Mood monitors, conversely, reported more intense affective states, 
stated that their moods affected their behavior adversely and that they had poor success 
regulating their moods.  In an earlier study, they had found that scores on the Beck 
Depression Inventory were negatively predicted by mood labeling, while reported ability 
to regulate negative mood was positively predicted by mood labeling.  (Swinkels and 
Giuliano, 1992).  These results are consistent with the concept of precise mood labeling 
being positively related to the ability to regulate mood.    
 Feldman Barrett et al. (2001) examined the relationship between emotional 
differentiation and emotion regulation by evaluating subjects’ emotion journals for levels 
of emotion differentiation; this level of emotion differentiation was then compared to 
self-reports of emotion regulation.  They found that emotion differentiation correlated 
significantly with regulation for negative but not for positive emotion, and pointed to the 
results of Schwarz & Clore (1983) suggesting that in our culture, negative emotions are 
more subject to regulation than are positive emotions.  The authors related their results 
first to the “affect-as-information” perspective which states that specific emotional states 
are less subject to misattribution errors (Keltner et al, 1993; Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & 
Clore, 1996).   Specifically, discrete emotions, unlike global states, are typically 
associated with identification of a causal object (Russell & Feldman Barrett, 1999) 
which, as suggested above, is likely to be useful in the process of emotion regulation 
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Mesquita & Frijda, 1992.)  
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 An exception to the positive relationship between emotion differentiation and 
emotion regulation has been observed in individuals with generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD).  Current thinking on GAD suggests that it may be rightfully classified as a 
disorder of emotion regulation (Mennin et al., 2005; Turk et al., 2005); however, Novick-
Kline et al. (2005) recently demonstrated that individuals diagnosed with GAD showed 
higher levels of emotion awareness/differentiation than controls.  This is inconsistent 
with the generally accepted model of poor emotion regulation relating to poor emotion 
differentiation, and the authors suggest that this anxiety disorder may result from a 
different or more complex form of emotion dysregulation.  For this reason, anxiety will 
not be a focus of the present study.   
 The above studies suggest that the ability to precisely identify emotional states 
may be useful in the process of regulating these emotions, but they do not address the 
sources of the wide range of individual differences seen in this ability.  Given that 
perception of physiological arousal has been identified as instrumental in generating 
emotion, an examination of individual differences in these somatic perceptions and how 
they relate to emotion awareness may be informative.  Specifically, the question arises 
whether differentiation of emotion relates to either differentiation of or sensitivity to 
somatic cues.   
Models of Emotional Reaction, Awareness, and Regulation 
Somatic awareness and attention to internal cues.  The modest relationship 
between general baseline body awareness and awareness of physiological arousal in 
emotion (Shields & Simon, 1991) was described earlier.  How and to what extent an 
individual attends to and perceives body cues in the presence of an emotional stimulus 
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varies widely and is not well understood.  The demonstrated relationship between the 
magnitude of direct measurement of physiological arousal and the perception of that 
arousal as assessed by self-report has repeatedly been weak (Blascovich, 1990; 
Blascovich & Katkin, 1982; Pennebaker & Hoover, 1984; Pennebaker & Roberts, 1992).  
This relationship varies between as well as within individuals; that is, a given individual 
may be more aware of some forms of physiological arousal (heart rate) than others (blood 
pressure, sweating) (Katkin et al., 1981; Reed et al., 1990).   
 A model for explaining individual differences in attention to internal cues has 
been described by Blascovich (1990).  In his biopsychosocial model, he defines a 
personality dimension at whose extremes are “hypersensitive” and “hyposensitive” 
individuals.  The term “hypersensitive” is used to describe individuals who are 
specifically sensitive to somesthetic cues, that is, perception of physiological arousal. 
Hypersensitive individuals are described as those likely to look to internal cues for 
confirmation of their attributions of arousal, whereas hyposensitive individuals are likely 
to get more information from external cues.  Blascovich postulates that attentional 
capacity in response to emotion stimuli must be split between internal (somesthetic) and 
external (environmental) stimuli.  He appears to regard this as a subconscious process 
which is independent of cognitive appraisal.  The allocation of attention varies as a 
function of the relative strength of perception of internal and external cues; these 
differences are presumably in dispositional sensitivity to somesthetic (body) cues.  
Blascovich’s description of allocation of attention in response to emotional stimuli 
suggests, consistent with the findings of Shields & Simon (1991), that this attentional 
distribution may be re-allocated in the presence of emotional stimulus.  Thus when 
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aroused, hypersensitive individuals get relatively more information about autonomic 
arousal whereas hyposensitive individuals get relatively more information about valence.  
Blascovich’s model does not specify the nature of the arousal information; that is, it is not 
clear whether his hypersensitive individual has more information about intensity of 
physical symptoms, specificity of physical symptoms, or both.   
 In a later study, Blascovich (1992) demonstrated a negative correlation between 
emotional intensity (in this case, the trait of experiencing emotions intensely) and 
attention to internal mood states, thus causing him to postulate that emotion intensity may 
be positively related to external attention.  Reisenzein (1994) observed a relationship 
between emotion intensity and the tendency to view a situation as personally relevant.  
Results of the two studies suggest that individuals more attentive to external cues should 
be more likely to judge social (external) situations as personally relevant and thus be 
more emotionally reactive to their environment (Frijda, 1986; Reisenzein, 1994).  
Similarly, Larsen & Diener (1987) corroborated these findings in an independent study 
demonstrating an association between the tendency to experience affect intensely and a 
tendency to be emotionally responsive to cues from the environment.  Together, these 
studies suggest that individuals who are attentive to external cues tend both to be 
emotionally responsive to these cues, and to experience emotion intensely.   
 The appearance of Blascovich’s model was followed by a number of studies 
aimed at further describing the nature of attention paid to both internal (somatic) and 
external cues during emotion formation.   A concept of affect as being a two-dimensional 
construct was initially developed by Reizenstein (1994) and Russell (1989) and has more 
recently been studied by Feldman (1995).  The dimensions of valence and arousal are 
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described as being subjective perceptions with valence being “the hedonic quality of 
pleasantness associated with emotion” and arousal as “the perception of arousal 
associated with such an experience.”   The terms “valence focus” and “arousal focus” 
were proposed to reflect the degree to which different individuals incorporate the 
subjective experience of valence and arousal into their emotional experiences (Feldman, 
1995).  Individuals high on arousal focus are those with a tendency to attend to internal 
sensations, while those high on valence focus are those with a tendency to attend 
preferentially to the pleasant or unpleasant aspects of an affective experience. This new 
terminology suggests a restructuring of Blascovich’s model; although his 
“hypersensitive” individuals are described by the two-dimensional model as those high in 
arousal focus, his “hyposensitive” individuals, focused on external stimuli, are 
reconceptualized  by the two-dimensional model, as being high in valence focus 
(perception of and attention to intensity).  The difference between the two models lies in 
their identification of the “core” trait of individuals low in arousal focus; one model 
posits this trait as valence focus, or attention to emotion intensity; the other model 
suggests that the core trait, interpreted as valence focus in the first model, is actually 
attention to external cues.  The focus of these studies has been on the precise nature and 
consequences of diminished attention to internal states.  Some discussion of the 
implications for internal focus is presented below. 
Information about internal states and emotion differentiation.  Because the 
literature has suggested that differentiation of emotional states is positively correlated 
with some aspects of conscious emotion regulation, we describe here the aspects of 
somatic arousal experience that might relate to this process.  Only two studies were found 
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demonstrating a relationship between attention to body cues and differentiation of 
specific emotional states.  Feldman (1995), in a study of 24 undergraduates, demonstrated 
relationships between the extent of valence focus (i.e., the ability to differentiate between 
different levels of positive or negative feeling), extent of arousal focus, (ability to 
differentiate between and describe different levels of physiological arousal) and self-
report of anxious and depressed mood.  She found that individuals vary in the degree to 
which valence and arousal are components of their mood ratings (i.e. that ratio of valence 
content to arousal content varies), and that the ability to distinguish between depressive 
and anxious symptoms was positively related to focus on both valence and arousal, that 
is, minimal levels of both types of awareness were required.  In attempting to explain 
these results, Feldman cites Blascovich’s model (1992), which posits that those 
individuals with sufficient arousal focus (those higher in “hypersensitivity” or 
somesthetic awareness) would be more likely to distinguish between two negative 
(similarly valenced) emotional states.  In her study, differentiating depression from 
anxiety requires, in addition to acknowledging negative valence, the distinction between 
an increase or a decrease in level of specific aspects of autonomic arousal.  
 Parkes (1981), in an earlier study, had made a similar point by correlating field 
independence with the ability to distinguish between symptoms of depression and 
anxiety, although not with overall affect intensity.  The constructs of field dependence 
and field independence, discussed in more detail below (Witkin, 1950), stipulate that a 
field independent individual has the quality of being able to “differentiate” perceived 
information.  Thus Parkes’s field independent subjects, better able to distinguish internal 
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from external cues and presumably between internal states, were similarly better able to 
distinguish between two negative emotional states.  
Field dependence/independence.  An interesting finding from the research on 
manipulation of facial expressions discussed earlier is that these behavioral manipulations 
affect the emotional responses of only a portion of the population.  Examination of 
individual differences suggested that those people who were emotionally responsive to 
their own behaviors were those who were focused on their own bodies and personal cues 
as opposed to situational cues (Duclos & Laird, 2001; Flack et al., 1999; Kellerman et al., 
1989; Williams & Kleinke, 1993).  Laird, in attempting to devise a method for screening 
these individuals for experimental purposes, found that measures of self-consciousness, 
self-monitoring, internal/external locus of control, and body consciousness all failed to 
correlate with the behavior, although body consciousness measures produced “parallel” 
results.  He found, however, that the emotional response to imitation behavior correlated 
best with field independence as measured, optimally, by the rod and frame test and 
alternatively by the embedded figures method (James Laird, personal communication, 
2006).        
 The concept of field dependence/independence was first articulated by Herman 
Witkin, whose interest was in understanding how individuals orient themselves in space.  
His initial study required that subjects in a darkened room orient a luminous rod to the 
vertical when the rod and a surrounding luminous frame were tilted.  He found that two 
extremes of perceptual orientation could be identified; one group, which he described as 
field-dependent, used the frame or external visual cues to orient the rod, while the other, 
field-independent group, relied more on internal or proprioceptive cues and moved the 
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rod closer to true gravitational vertical (Witkin, 1948).  Witkin’s initial interpretation was 
that these two groups differed in “the extent to which the organization of the prevailing 
field dominates perception of any of its parts” (Witkin et al., p. 8, 1971). Two other 
measures were developed for the assessment of field dependence/independence.  The 
Body Awareness Test (BAT) (Witkin, 1949) requires that a subject orient himself to 
vertical in a tilted room and the Embedded Figures Test (EFT) (Witkin, 1950) requires 
that a subject differentiate a simple geometric figure from a more complex drawing in 
which it is embedded.  Results of these measures were found to correlate highly with 
results of the Rod and Frame Test; the combination of the three has been used as a 
standard battery for the assessment of field independence.   
 The description of the field dependence/independence construct has generated a 
large body of research; what originally appeared as a difference in visual perceptual style 
has subsequently been shown to correlate with differences in general perceptual style, 
cognitive style, perception of self, body concept, as well as psychological defenses used 
(Witkin et al., 1971).  Witkin’s differentiation hypothesis, which suggests that the 
tendency of field independent individuals is to differentiate and organize information 
from all sources, is relevant to this study.  He suggests that among the categories of 
information noticably differentiated by field-independent individuals is body 
(somatosensory) information, and that field-dependent individuals, by contrast, often 
have difficulty describing exactly what they are feeling (Witkin et al., 1974). This 
articulated body concept was demonstrated repeatedly in both children and adults with 
articulated (field independent) cognitive style:  Figure drawings included more detail, 
more realistic proportions, and greater attempts at role representation relative to drawings 
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of subjects with a more global (field dependent) style (Karp et al., 1969; Winestine, 
1969). Using more experimental means to evaluate the articulation/global difference, 
Silverman et al. (1961) observed that field independent men show finer 2-point 
discrimination on the back of a hand than do field-dependent men.  Field independent 
men also tend to show more accurate identification of letters written with a rod on the 
forehead and dorsum of the hand (Cohen et al., 1962).   
 The nature of body boundaries as an aspect of body concept was investigated in a 
study by Fisher and Cleveland (1958).  These authors developed a ‘barrier index’, based 
on Rorschach content, which expressed the extent to which perceived body boundaries 
are effective at separating body from environment.  Women with high barrier scores were 
found to be significantly more field independent than those with low scores; the results 
for men were in the same direction but were less significant.    
 Relevant to the present study were early concerns that differences seen in the 
body alignment task (BAT) for assessing field dependence might be a result of body 
sensitivity rather than differentiation.  Witkin & Wapner (1950) demonstrated that tests 
of body balance and body steadiness, both of which involve use of body cues, had little 
relation to field independence.  They further demonstrated that field independent 
individuals lost their advantage in the body alignment test when their eyes were closed, 
and concluded that alignment with the eyes shut depended on body sensitivity rather than 
differentiation of information which was, in fact, a different construct.   
 The concept of field independence as a cognitive ability has been advanced by 
some researchers who observed that field independence correlates significantly with the 
Block Design and Picture Completion, subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
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(WAIS) although poorly with the overall WAIS score itself (Goodenough & Karp, 1961; 
Karp, 1963).  It has been proposed, however, that the ability to differentiate and 
categorize information is a component of intelligence, and that field dependence 
represents a specific deficit. 
  The field dependence/independence construct has not been prominent as a factor 
in the study of emotion and emotion regulation.  Parkes (1981) noted that field 
independent individuals, although better able to differentiate symptoms, showed similar 
levels of pathology (depression and anxiety) as field dependents in a single study.  
Witkin, in an early review, concluded that the level of psychopathology does not differ as 
a function of level of field independence, although the nature of psychological disorder 
does (Witkin et al., 1971).  He also points out that individuals at either extreme on the 
continuum are at higher risk for any psychopathology than individuals with more 
moderate field dependence (Witkin et al., 1954).  The study by Parkes (1981) described 
above which demonstrated the ability of field-independents to differentiate depression 
and anxiety, and the finding by Laird (J. Laird, personal communication, 2006) that 
emotional response to facial expressions correlated with field independence are the only 
two studies known to this author that specifically mention the construct in relation to 
emotions.  Both studies suggest a relationship between somasthetic perception and the 
experience of emotion, and both suggest that the tendency to attend to somasthetic cues 
may be related to field independence.   
The hypersensitive/hyposensitive extremes proposed by Blascovich and the more 
refined valence focus/arousal focus model both have characteristics of the distinction 
between field independence and field dependence, and it is puzzling why the comparison 
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is not made in the literature.  If an individual’s level of emotion differentiation is 
predicted by field independence, this implies characteristics of cognitive style across a 
range of functions.  This is, presumably, a more complex construct than Blascovich’s 
“hypersensitivity” model or the valence/arousal model of Reisenzein/Russell/Feldman-
Barrett.  Each approach to explaining differences in types of emotion focus ultimately 
suggests, however, that this differentiation is a result of increased attention to internal 
(somatic) information, albeit possibly for different reasons.  Blascovich’s concept of 
hypersensitivity is less explicit than the concept of field independence; his description of 
individuals as being more “attentive” to internal states may or may not include the 
differentiation of information that Witkin’s definition of field independence implies.  
However, his description of the hyposensitive individual who attends preferentially to 
external cues resembles Witkin’s field dependent individual who attends to external cues 
and does not differentiate himself effectively from them. The valence/arousal model of 
Reisenzein/Russell/Barrett comes close to the field dependence/independence model in 
that it invokes differentiation of internal states; however, this model differs from Witkin’s 
model in its simplification of field dependence to “valence focus.”  As mentioned earlier, 
it is difficult to know if any of these constructs best accounts for individual differences 
observed, or whether the core traits that result in lack of emotional awareness are as yet 
undefined.  
Model for field dependence/independence in emotion regulation.  The above 
review suggests and describes relationships between several of the variables related to 
emotion regulation.  First, the relationship between non-emotional body awareness and 
awareness of emotional physiological arousal is observed but is modest.  Second, the 
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relationship between emotion awareness and ability to regulate emotion is not simple and 
suggests that awareness of emotion specificity (emotion differentiation) rather than 
awareness of emotion intensity is positively related to emotion regulation.  Third, it 
appears that the emotion differentiation necessary for effective regulation may be related 
to the ability to differentiate somatic information during states of emotional arousal.  And 
fourth, the ability to distinguish the autonomic arousal signals accompanying different 
emotions may be a traitlike quality independent of overall baseline body awareness.  A 
precise description of the traits has not been established, although the concept of valence 
focus/arousal focus is the model most recently put forth.   
 This review is intended to provide background for the study of a model to 
describe the relationship between field dependence/independence and emotion regulation.  
Testing of this model was intended to examine the hypothesis that the “attentiveness to 
internal states” observed to accompany emotion regulation may be a construct which, in 
fact, resembles field independence.  In addition, the study attempted to relate baseline 
body awareness to emotion regulation; observation of such a relationship would provide a 
rationale for the development of an intervention to improve body awareness as a means to 
improve emotion regulation.  This has been a popular topic for graduate research; and 
appears in more dissertations than can be mentioned here.  Briefly, however, some topics 
addressed have been the relationship between somatic awareness and moods (Heberlein, 
1988), sensorimotor therapy for treatment of trauma (Ogden, 2003), the effects of a 
somatic awareness intervention on emotion regulation and golf performance (Bouchard, 
2001), and somatic practice for transforming conflict (Deer, 2000).  In addition, body 
awareness training is utilized for fibromyalgia and chronic pain as well as for chronic 
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aspecific psychosomatic symptoms (CAPS) (Gard, 2005; Kendall et al., 2000; 
Landsman-Dijkstra et al., 2006).   
Mindfulness based body awareness and attention to internal cues.  Most relevant 
to the hypotheses to be presented here, however, are two studies on the effects of 
mindfulness training. The first study addressed anxiety reduction, and the second 
investigated the effects of mindfulness on prefrontal EEG asymmetry, which, as 
discussed earlier, has been related to affect and its regulation.  Mindfulness Based Stress 
Reduction (MBSR) (Kabat-Zinn, 2003) is a method commonly used with considerable 
success in training individuals to reduce their stress levels; the program includes three 
components of training:  (1) meditation, (2) breathing meditation/awareness, in which the 
individual is taught to focus on the sound of his breathing, and (3) the body scan; a 
directed exercise in which the individual listens to a voice directing him/her to mentally 
scan, over a period of forty minutes, over all parts of his/her body.  In a study of 22 
medical patients with DSM-III-R-defined anxiety disorders, Kabat-Zinn et al. (1993) 
were able to demonstrate a significant reduction in level of anxiety following an 8-week 
administration of the MBSR training; these results were found to persist in significant 
measure at both 3-month and 3-year follow-up (Miller et al., 1995).  In a second study 
utilizing MBSR, a non-clinical population undergoing 8 weeks of the training was 
observed to demonstrate a significant shift in prefrontal EEG asymmetry, with a 
relatively increased left prefrontal signal indicative, in accordance with Davidson’s work 
on EEG asymmetry, of increased positive affect and increased ability to regulate emotion 
or to cope with stress (Davidson et al., 2003).  The concept of mindfulness, as articulated 
by Kabat-Zinn, refers to the ability to control the placement of consciousness (Kabat-
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Zinn, 1993) and is rooted in the eastern Zen tradition.  Mindfulness is generally taught 
using meditative or breathing techniques; the inclusion of body scan is unique to Kabat-
Zinn’s program and brings to mind questions about the mechanism of action.  For 
example:  (1) Are the observed effects a result of the interaction of the three components 
of the training, or might a single component be effective, in some measure, independently 
of the others?  In the context of the above admittedly sparse literature on the relationship 
between body awareness and emotion regulation, and the Davidson study showing EEG 
changes, one might question whether the body scan component of the MBSR package 
alone might be effective at improving emotion regulation.  (2)  Does the body scan work 
by increasing body awareness, or does it simply help the individual diminish his attention 
to external cues, as do the meditative and breathing exercises?  Restated, is the observed 
clinical effect a general cognitive/attentional effect, or a simply a result of enhanced 
somatic awareness?   
The Present Study 
  The present study was intended to provide background for the design of a body 
awareness intervention, and to better understand some of the cognitive basis for attention 
to internal cues. It examined whether field independence is significant in the process of 
emotion regulation, and if so, how the relationship might be mediated.  The study 
questions whether the valence/arousal model from the literature might be better described 
as a field dependence/independence model.  Specifically, it asked whether the extent of 
field dependence/independence is related to the ability to attend to and be aware of body 
cues in the face of emotional arousal.  It examined whether the ability to differentiate 
states of autonomic arousal was related to the ability to differentiate emotional states.   
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And it attempted to examine the relationship between differentiation of emotional states 
and multiple aspects of the emotion regulation process.      
 Evidence from the literature presented above suggests conflicting evidence on 
some of these questions.  In addition, although numerous studies are cited that examine 
one or more of the variables included in this study, none includes all steps in the path 
from field independence to emotion regulation.  We will propose a model here to 
describe a path from field independence to emotion regulation that includes the relevant 
variables explained above, as well as the relationships between them.  Specifically, this 
model includes:  (1) A first step relating field dependence/independence to awareness of 
autonomic arousal during emotional states.  This implies an ability to differentiate and be 
aware of multiple symptoms of arousal, and is distinguished from simple sensitivity to or 
awareness of intensity of arousal. (2) A second step relating awareness of arousal during 
emotional states to awareness (differentiation) of emotional states.  (3)  A third step 
relating this awareness and differentiation of emotional states (or lack thereof) to an 
overall difficulty with emotion regulation.  
Given the subscales of the emotion regulation measure, it was thought that 
emotion differentiation would relate most specifically to two particular subscales; those 
assessing goal-directed behavior and impulse control. Prediction of these specific 
relationships was based on suggestions from the literature that precise description of 
emotions enables precise definition and selection of coping strategies, which implies the 
ability to concentrate and focus, as well as to apply coping techniques in a goal-directed 
manner.    
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 Finally we examined the relationship between baseline body awareness and 
perception of autonomic arousal; although we did not expect body awareness to relate 
directly to emotion regulation, we anticipated that it might be indirectly related through 
autonomic perception.  We also examined whether field dependence/independence better 
predicts body awareness or autonomic perception in order to confirm our suspicion that it 
is the autonomic perception variable that should be included in the mediational model.   
 Self-report measures of baseline body awareness, autonomic perception of 
arousal, and difficulties with emotion regulation as well as evaluation by the examiner of 
measures of field dependence/independence and emotional differentiation were used to 
evaluate the following hypotheses: 
I. I hypothesized that baseline body awareness would significantly predict 
perception of autonomic arousal.  
II. I hypothesized that field independence would significantly predict baseline 
body awareness. 
III. I hypothesized that field independence would significantly predict 
perception of autonomic arousal and that this prediction would be stronger 
than the prediction by field independence of baseline body awareness.  
IV. I hypothesized that perception of autonomic arousal would significantly 
predict awareness and differentiation of emotions.   
V. I hypothesized that awareness of emotions would be a significant negative 
predictor of overall difficulty with emotion regulation as well as two of its 
components, difficulties with impulse control during emotional arousal 
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and difficulties maintaining goal directed behavior during emotional 
arousal.  
VI. I hypothesized that field independence exerts an indirect and negative 
effect on emotion regulation difficulty that is mediated by steps III, IV, 
and V above.
  
 
 
Methods 
 
 
Research Design 
 
 The present study employed a correlational, cross-sectional design in which 
variables of interest were assessed using observational and self report measures.  
Observational data was obtained from the evaluation by the examiner of two participant 
performance measures.   
Participants 
 
 Participants were taken from a group of 138 undergraduates enrolled in an 
introductory psychology course at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, who 
obtained course credit in exchange for their participation in the study.  Data from two 
participants was discarded when it was discovered that they had failed to complete the 
reverse side of one measure; thus the final N was 136.  Individuals currently taking 
medication for attention deficit disorder were not included in the study given that such 
medication could have affected their performance on the measure of field independence.  
This was listed as an exclusion criterion when students signed up for the study.  There 
were 11 males and 125 females ranging in age from 18 to 25 years old. 
Measures 
Difficulties with emotion regulation.  The Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scale (DERS) (Gratz & Roemer, 2004) (Appendix A) is a 36-item self-report measure 
designed to assess not only modulation of emotion arousal, but the awareness, 
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understanding, and acceptance of emotions, and the ability to act in appropriate ways in 
the presence of strong emotion.  The measure is unique in that it imparts a behavioral 
interpretation to the concept of “emotion regulation,” defining it as the ability to behave 
appropriately in the presence of strong, possibly negative emotion.  Factor analysis based 
on a sample of 357 young adults produced six components of the measure:  (1)  
Nonacceptance of Emotional Responses, reflecting the presence of negative emotion in 
response to primary emotional responses, (2)  Difficulties Engaging in Goal-Directed 
behavior, reflecting difficulties in concentrating and remaining engaged in the presence 
of negative emotion, (3) Impulse Control Difficulties, (4)  Lack of Emotional Awareness, 
(5)  Limited Access to Emotion Regulation Strategies, reflecting the belief that there is 
little to be done to regulate emotions once an individual is upset, and (6) Lack of 
Emotional Clarity, reflecting the extent to which individuals are aware of which emotions 
they are feeling.  Individuals are asked to rate each item on a 5-point Likert-type scale 
describing the frequency with which they experience a given thought or feeling related to 
their emotions (e.g., “I know exactly how I am feeling,” “When I am upset, I become 
angry with myself for feeling that way”).  Items are scored in the directions suggested by 
the individual wordings.  A positive score on any subscale or the overall measure is an 
indication of difficulty with emotion regulation.   
Psychometric properties of the measure are good.  Internal consistency for the 
individual subscales was adequate with Cronbach’s α > .80 for each subscale.  Construct 
validity was examined by calculating correlations between the DERS and its individual 
subscales with the Generalized Expectancy for Negative Mood Regulation Scale (NMR, 
Catanzaro & Means, 1990), the Emotional Expressivity Scale (EES, Kring et al., 1994), 
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and the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ, Hayes et al., 2004), a self-report 
measure of experiential avoidance.  All correlations were significant and in the expected 
directions.  Predictive validity was examined by evaluating correlations between the 
DERS and (1) frequency of self-harm, and (2) frequency of intimate partner abuse.  The 
overall DERS score showed highly significant correlations with self-harm in both men 
and women (r(97)) = .26 and r(260) = .20 respectively); the correlation with intimate 
partner abuse was significant only for males (r(96) = .34), consistent with expectations.  
Further support for criterion validity comes from the differential pattern of correlations 
with the behavioral measures and individual subscales (factors) of the measure; all 
subscales showed significant correlations with self-harm for women; correlations were 
less likely to be significant for men.  Correlations with intimate partner abuse were 
highest with the impulse control and goal directed behavior subscales for men, and the 
impulse control subscale for women.  Test-retest-reliability over a period ranging from 4 
to 8 weeks was good for the entire measure (ρ = .88) and adequate for the subscales, 
ranging from ρ = .57 to ρ = .89; all were significant.  Psychometric properties of this 
measure were established with a population of undergraduates as well as a group of 
individuals between the ages of 18 and 48.   
Body awareness.   The Body Awareness Questionnaire (BAQ, Shields et. al., 
1989) (Appendix B) is an 18-item self-report measure designed to assess awareness of 
normal body processes not associated with emotion or objective body image.  Individual 
items load onto four factors; (1) awareness of responses or changes in body processes 
(e.g. “I notice differences in the way my body reacts to various foods”); (2) ability to 
predict body reaction (“I always know when I’ve exerted myself to the point where I’ll be 
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sore the next day”); (3) awareness of sleep-wake cycle (“I am aware of a cycle in my 
activity level throughout the day”); and (4) awareness of onset of illness (“I know I’m 
running a fever without taking my temperature”).  Items are rated from 1 (“not at all true 
about me”) to 7 (“very true about me”).  Higher scores reflect higher levels of body 
awareness.  The measure is internally consistent (Cronbach’s α > .80), and has acceptable 
test-retest reliability (r = .80).  Discriminant validity was demonstrated partially by 
establishing that the BAQ did not correlate with correlates of a tendency to symptom 
reporting; specifically trait anxiety, low self-esteem, neuroticism, and hypochondriasis as 
assessed by the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI) Neuroticism scale (Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1963), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965), the Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1970), and the Pennebaker Inventory of Limbic 
Languidness (Pennebaker, 1982).  Furthermore, it did not correlate with the tendency to 
respond in a socially valued manner, assessed with the EPI lie scale.  Convergent validity 
was demonstrated by correlations with scores on the Public and Private Self-
Consciousness subscales of the Self Consciousness Inventory (Buss, 1980; Fenigstein et 
al., 1975), and Public and Private Body Consciousness subscales of the Body 
Consciousness Questionnaire (Miller et al., 1981), as well as a separate study comparing 
BAQ scores between a group of aerobics instructors and a random comparable group of 
women (Shields et al., 1989).  The scale is not correlated with age (initial validation tests 
included subjects up to 70 years old) and contains no items that are sex, age, or race 
specific.  Authors concluded that the measure is suitable for use in student and 
nonstudent adult populations. 
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Perception of autonomic arousal .  The Autonomic Perception Questionnaire-
Revision (APQ-R) (Shields, 1984) is a self-report questionnaire designed to determine an 
individual’s experience of body sensation during emotional arousal, both quantitatively 
(how intense, how often) and qualitatively (how many different sensations).  The measure 
is a modification of Mandler et al.’s 1958 measure which was intended to assess 
awareness of autonomic arousal during anxiety.  Shields’s modifications include 
additions of specific items to describe symptoms of both sadness and anger; the 30-item 
measure used in this study is the same as that used by Shields & Simon (1991), and 
includes all items from the sadness, anxiety, and anger subscales.  Internal consistency 
for individual subscales was good in Shields’s study (1984); Cronbach’s alphas ranged 
from .83 to .89. Only the  anger subscale was used in this study.  The participant was 
asked to remember a specific instance when he experienced anger, and then to use that 
description as a standard of reference for rating his or her symptoms on a 9-point Likert-
type scale. Items are phrased in sentence form and all begin (for the anger subscale) 
“When I feel angry (My hands become cold, I feel my heart beat faster….).”.  The scale 
ranges from not at all true about me (1) to neutral, not sure (5), to very true about me (9).  
The measure was scored by summing item values within each subscale.  
Level of emotion awareness/differentiation.  The Levels of Emotional Awareness 
Scale (LEAS) (Lane et al., 1990) is an observer-related questionnaire that measures 
emotional awareness in a manner consistent with the theory of Lane & Schwartz (1987).  
The content of the measure is such that in order to receive a score suggesting high 
awareness of emotions, one must also be able to differentiate simultaneous emotions. 
Thus, although the LEAS assesses emotion awareness, high awareness scores on this 
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measure also imply emotion differentiation.  The original measure consists of 20 
hypothetical scenes, each of which is described in two to four sentences, involves two 
people, and is designed to elicit four types of emotion (anger, fear, happiness, and 
sadness).  The different scenarios are designed to elicit and assess for different levels of 
complexity of emotional awareness (Lane & Schwartz, 1987); for example, level one 
scenarios cue for bodily sensations such as the pain when hitting your finger with a 
hammer.  Level two scenarios cue for an action tendency or global arousal such as the 
reaction to a foreign acquaintance making derogatory remarks about one’s native country.  
Level three scenarios attempt to elicit emotional extremes; an example scenario describes 
an individual waiting in line at a bank while the person in front of him/her makes a long 
transaction.  Level four scenarios cue for blends of possibly opposing emotions that may 
be experienced simultaneously, such as a reaction to a friend whom you’ve told to call 
anytime calling you in the middle of the night.  Level five scenarios call for more 
complex and differentiated emotion states, such as the reaction one might have if his 
friend changed his mind about investing in a business venture with him. 
After reading a scene, a participant is asked to write a response to two questions:  
“How would you feel?”, and “How would the other person feel?”  Responses are scored 
for each person and for each scene.  A Level 0 response is described as a non-emotional 
response such as a thought or cognitive state without emotional content; for example, 
“confused.”  A Level 1 response, suggestive of very low emotional awareness, reflects 
either an awareness of body sensation or a frank statement of no emotion or of emotional 
uncertainty (“I don’t know what he would feel”).  A Level 2 response, interpreted as 
expressing low emotional awareness, includes undifferentiated emotion words (“I’d feel 
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bad”, or “I’d feel like crying”).  Level 3 responses are interpreted as indicating average 
emotional awareness; they include expressions of differentiated emotion such as “He’s 
really mad” as opposed to “He feels bad”.  Level 4 responses are composed of two or 
more distinct Level 3 responses (“I’d feel frustrated, but happy for him all the same”), 
and are considered to reflect high emotional awareness.  Level 5 responses, given when 
Level 4 scores are given for both “self” and “other” responses, are interpreted to mean 
superior emotional awareness.  High scores from each scenario are summed to generate a 
possible total score of 100. 
Psychometric properties were initially examined in a study of 38 participants.  
Convergent validity of the LEAS was examined using Pearson product moment 
correlations with other measures tapping aspects of emotion awareness and expression.  
Significant positive correlations with the Parental Description Conceptual Level score 
(Blatt et al., 1979) (r(38) = .35) and the Loevinger Sentence Completion Test (Loevinger 
& Wessler, 1970) (r(38) = .40) demonstrate a correlation with measures of emotional 
complexity.  In addition, the LEAS correlated significantly and positively with the 
Openness to Experience (Coan, 1972) total score (r(38) = .33).  Finally, a comparison 
with the Differential Emotions Scale (Izard, 1972), demonstrated a highly significant 
negative correlation with the Denied Emotions subscale (r(38) = -.27), consistent with the 
LEAS measuring level of emotional awareness.  Discriminant validity was demonstrated 
by the absence of a significant relationship to either positive or negative emotion 
subscales of the Differential Emotions Scale, the Manifest Anxiety Scale (Bendig, 1956) 
or the Marlowe-Crowne Scale of social desirability (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).  The 
possibility that the LEAS was measuring “verbal productivity” rather than complexity 
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was ruled out by summing the words across the 20 scenes and correlating with the LEAS 
score; the correlation was non-significant (r(38) = .12).  Interrater reliability, based on 
twenty protocols scored by two raters, was high (r(20) = .84).  Internal consistency, 
measured by Cronbach’s alpha, was .81 (n=35).   
The present study utilized a modified form of the LEAS entitled the LEAS-A 
which included only 10 scenarios but which included the same distribution of levels of 
complexity of emotion.  Although the LEAS was used in its long form in earliest studies, 
the modified shortened form has appeared in more recent studies due to the length of time 
required to both complete and score the 20-item measure (Frewen et al., 2008; Subic-
Wrana et al., 2005).  The psychometric properties of the short form have not been 
established, but the results observed in both cited studies were significant and as 
hypothesized (R. Lane, private communication).   
Field dependence/independence.  The Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) 
(Oltman et al., 1971), modified from the Embedded Figures Test described below,  is an 
18-item, timed performance test designed to assess an individual’s ability to organize and 
differentiate information in a complex visual field.  The task is to visually identify a 
simple, two-dimensional geometric figure which has been embedded within a larger, 
complex figure, the design of which has been organized so as to obscure the target simple 
figure.  The participant’s score on the test is rate in figures per minute at which the 
participant identifies the simple figure in the complex background. 
The original Embedded Figures Test (Witkin et al., 1971) contained 24 complex 
figures and 8 simple figures; the complex figures were presented to the subject in series, 
and a maximum time of 5 minutes was allotted for the location of the given target figure 
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within the complex field.   The procedure for administration consists of presenting the 
participant with a card containing a representation of a simple target figure, labeled from 
A through H, for ten seconds.  The simple figure is then removed and a complex figure 
containing it is presented.  The amount of time required, up to 3 minutes, for the 
participant to correctly identify the simple figure in this complex figure and trace it with a 
stylus is recorded. The final score is the average of the 24 individual times in seconds.  
High scores are indicative of field independence, low scores suggest field dependence.   
Short forms of the EFT have been developed; the EFT A and B versions each 
contain 12 of the original 24 complex figures and use a 3-minute limit per figure. 
Reliabilities for the short form of the test were computed using Tryon’s variance method 
and come from comparisons of the 24-items and 12-item tests as well as comparisons of 
odd and even items.  Reliabilities ranged from .79 for female college students, .82 and .85 
for male college students, and .90 and .82 for male and female adults respectively 
(Witkin et al, 1971).  Convergent and discriminant validity were demonstrated in several 
ways; the tests are too numerous to list here, but are cited in Witkin et al, 1974.  
Specifically:  (1) The EFT was demonstrated to relate positively to other tests of 
perceptual discrimination  but not to performance tests which require other skills such as 
sustained attention, concentration, or verbal comprehension. (2) The EFT was 
demonstrated to relate to cognitive/intellectual aspects of psychological differentiation. 
(3) EFT scores were shown to relate to nature of psychological defenses with low scorers 
more likely to engage in isolation and intellectual defenses while high scorers tended to 
use global techniques of repression and denial. (4)  EFT scores were shown to relate 
predictably to numerous different forms of psychopathology.  
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The present study utilized the Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT), a version 
of the EFT which was adapted for group administration.  The measure was developed 
with the goal of increasing ease and speed of administration and had been used 
extensively with both groups and individuals (Oltman et al., 1971). Psychometric 
properties of the measure have been tested: Internal consistency, test-retest reliability, 
and both concurrent validity and criterion validity relative to the Rod and Frame Test 
were found to be acceptable (Kepner & Niemark, 1984; Moran, 1983; Panek et al., 1980; 
Witkin et al., 1971).    
The measure as used in the current study consists of 18 complex figures; in each 
figure, one of 8 simple figures is buried.  Each participant was given a booklet consisting 
of written instructions; the 8 simple figures are displayed on the back cover of the book, 
and two complex figures are displayed per page.  Participants completed simple practice 
items individually; this was followed by a 2-minute timed group practice section which 
included  7 complex figures.  When it was established that everyone understood the task, 
an 18-item timed section was administered.  Each complex figures includes a caption that 
reads “Find simple figure X (where X = figures A through H) in the above figure”.   
Participants were informed that they would be given 7 minutes to find as many simple 
figures in these complex figures as they could; they were additionally told that they were 
not expected to complete the measure.  Provisions were made for participants who 
completed the measure before the time limit; they were instructed to raise their hands 
quietly if they finished before time was called.  Participants were sitting in a circle facing 
outward and were not able to see one another; they were thus unlikely to be aware of one 
another’s performance. 
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Standard administration of the original GEFT consisted of administering the 18 
figures in two different 5-minute timed segments.  It was discovered in preliminary 
sessions of this study, when participants were timed individually, that this population was 
completing the task in much less time than 5 minutes; thus a 5-minute test session 
sometimes included considerable downtime and was not representative of time to 
complete the task.  After multiple individual timings, a time of  7 minutes total for the 18 
figures was selected as giving optimal spread in performance.  This limit was short 
enough that most participants did not complete the measure, but long enough that most 
participants got some score.  It has been observed elsewhere in the literature that norms 
for the measure, even within a college student population, have varied.  Preliminary 
norms (Witkin et al., 1971) and those measured five years later (Renna & Zenhausen, 
1976), both from smaller liberal arts school in the U.S., showed samples who more field 
dependent than that observed in 1980 (Carter & Loo, 1980) at a large Canadian 
university.  The authors attributed the difference to cultural changes as well as 
educational setting.  A casual observation of the present study was that most of the very 
high scores on field independence, expressed as the speed with which embedded figures 
were identified, were achieved by male students.  Cultural differences, specifically time 
spent playing video games and attending to visual media, may account for this shift in 
norms, particularly among young males.  Data from preliminary sessions was included as 
these individuals were all timed carefully, and results were reported in figures 
identified/minute. 
 
 
 47 
Procedure 
 Participants were seen in groups of 6 to 8 individuals.  At the start of the session, 
participants were informed that the study was concerned with differences in individual 
experiences of emotion.  They were told that the duration of the session would be 1.5 - 2 
hours, and that the tasks would consist primarily of pencil-and-paper self-report measures 
with a single timed task.  They were then asked to sign a consent form. Participants were 
given the Difficulties With Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) first, followed by the 
Levels of Emotional Awareness Scales (LEAS-A), the Body Awareness Questionnaire 
(BAQ), and the Autonomic Perception Questionnaire (APQ).  It was explained that the 
LEAS-A generally produced individual variations in time required to complete the 
measure, and that they should work at whatever speed felt comfortable.  Participants were 
asked to leave the room when they finished these measures; this provided a break and 
allowed those who wrote more slowly to complete their tasks without feeling pressured.   
The last measure administered was the timed Group Embedded Figures Test.  Following 
completion of the last measure, participants were debriefed with the explanation that our 
interest was in the relationship between field independence, body awareness in different 
states, and the experience and regulation of emotion.   
Statistical Analysis 
 Data for the study was analyzed using Mplus (Version 4.1), a structural equation 
modeling software (Muthen & Muthen, 1998-2006).  The mediational model proposed 
was tested using a set of simultaneous linear regression equations representing the 
individual steps in the mediational pathway.  Mplus performs a simultaneous analysis of 
these regressions and produces a model whose parameters represent overall fit of all 
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regressions.  Output includes regression coefficients, standard errors, and r2  and p values 
for each individual step as well as for the overall model.  In addition, the bivariate 
relationships that were proposed independently of the mediation pathway were tested by 
simple bivariate regressions.  
  
 
 
 
Results 
 
 Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the present study are displayed in 
Table 1.  Included are means and standard deviations for the Group Embedded Figures 
Test (GEFT), the Body Awareness Questionnaire (BAQ), the Autonomic Perception 
Questionnaire (APQ), the Levels of Emotional Awareness Scales (A) (LEAS-A), the 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scales (DERS), and the DERS subscales: Clarity 
(CLA), Limited Access to Emotion Regulation Strategies (STR), Lack of Emotional 
Awareness (AWA), Impulse Control Difficulties (IMP), Difficulties Engaging in Goal-  
Directed Behaviors (GLS), and Nonacceptance of Emotional Responses (NAC).  The 
total number of responses in each mean is the same (136) for all but the GEF which was 
missing for participants 14 and 25.  The estimator feature of Mplus, was used to estimate 
these two values.    
 This study proposed a number of bivariate relationships which were synthesized 
into an overall mediational model.  This larger model will be discussed first, followed by 
examination of the individual steps.   
Hypothesis VI proposed an overall model relating decrease in field independence 
(GEFT) to increased emotion regulation difficulty (DERS), suggesting that this 
relationship was mediated by perception of autonomic arousal (APQ) and emotion 
awareness (LEAS-A).  The model and relevant data are displayed in Table 2.  The overall 
mediational model was not supported (r2 = 0.000, p=.207).  Analysis of the individual 
steps, proposed in Hypotheses III – V provides insight into this overall lack of fit.  
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for all Variables 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable    N     Mean   Standard Deviation 
_______________________________________________________________________
GEFT   136     1.623 a     0.823 
 
BAQ   136         83.126               14.545 
 
APQ   136                   133.199              32.922 
 
LEAS   136            33.235                5.410 
 
NAC   136            12.654     5.326 
 
GLS   136            16.816     9.617 
 
IMP   136            10.390     3.559 
 
AWA   136            12.897     4.043 
 
STR   136            16.721     6.067 
 
CLA   136            10.552     2.870 
 
DERS   136            79.302              17.980 
________________________________________________________________________ 
NOTE. GEFT=Group Embedded Figures Test, score represents items identified/minute; 
BAQ=Body Awareness Questionnaire; APQ=Autonomic Perception Questionnaire; 
LEAS=Levels of Emotional Awareness Scales; NAC= NONACCEPTANCE subscale of 
the Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scales (DERS); GLS = GOALS subscale of the 
DERS; IMP=IMPULSIVITY subscale of the DERS; AWA=AWARENESS subscale of 
the DERS; STR=STRATEGIES subscale of the DERS; CLA=CLARITY subscale of the 
DERS; DERS=DERS total score.   
 
a  Two missing data points were supplied by Mplus estimator function. 
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Table 2 
Regression Coefficients for the  Mediational Model Relating Field Dependence/ 
Independence (GEFT) to Difficulty With Emotion Regulation (DERS) 
 
           β1GEFT  β2APQ  β3LEAS   DERS   
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Predictor  β                  β   p 
               Std 
                                                                    Error 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
GEFT         0.536                            3.434                              .876 
 
APQ        0.029*                            .014                               .032 
 
LEAS-A              -0.053                              .285                               .852 
 
 
Model:  r2 (3, 132)  = 0.000, p = .207 
________________________________________________________________________ 
NOTE. GEFT=Field Independence in Figures Identified/Minute as measured by the 
Group Embedded Figures Test; APQ=Autonomic Perception as measured by the 
Autonomic Perception Questionnaire; LEAS-A=Emotion Awareness as measured by the 
Levels of Emotion Awareness Scales; DERS=Difficulties With Emotion Regulation 
Scales.   
* p≤ .05 
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Regression coefficients for the independent variables on one another are displayed 
in Table 3; this includes field dependence/independence (GEFT), body awareness (BAQ),  
perception of autonomic arousal (APQ), and emotional awareness (LEAS-A). Data 
relevant to Hypotheses I, II, III, and IV are contained in this table. Hypothesis I, which 
predicted a relationship between body awareness and perception of autonomic arousal, 
was supported: Body awareness (BAQ) was a highly significant predictor of perception 
of autonomic arousal (APQ) (t(134) = 3.01,  p = .003) such that increased body 
awareness predicted increased perception of arousal. This relationship was not a part of 
the overall mediational model, but was included as a possible route to manipulating 
perception of autonomic arousal, a variable in the proposed mediation pathway. 
Hypothesis II was not supported, however, in that field dependence/ independence 
(GEFT) failed to predict baseline body awareness (BAQ) (Table 3).  This hypothesis was  
not a part of the overall mediational model but was tested in order to determine whether 
field dependence/independence better predicts baseline body awareness or perception of 
arousal.    
 Similar to Hypothesis II, Hypothesis III was not supported; field 
dependence/independence did not predict autonomic perception.  The assertion by 
Hypothesis III that field dependence/independence better predicts autonomic arousal than 
baseline body awareness is not supported by the data, but is also not directly testable.  
 Hypothesis IV relating autonomic perception to emotion awareness was 
supported; data for this bivariate regression is displayed in Table 3.  Autonomic 
perception (APQ) significantly predicted emotion awareness/differentiation (LEAS-A)  
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Table 3   
 
Coefficients for Regression of Independent Variables,  Field Independence (measured by 
the GEFT), Body Awareness (BAQ), Autonomic Perception (APQ), and Emotional 
Awareness (measured by the LEAS-A) on one another. 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Independent Dependent          β         β            r2     p      
Variable Variable                                  Standard 
                                                                           Error 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
BAQ  APQ      0.568   0.189             0.063              0.003**   
 
GEFT  BAQ       1.444   1.541             0.007              0.349   
 
GEFT  APQ       0.536   3.434             0.000              0.876      
 
APQ  LEAS-A               0.029             0.014 0.032              0.034*      
 
GEFT              LEAS-A      -0.663   0.561             0.010              0.238      
 
BAQ  LEAS-A             -0.045   0.032             0.014              0.159     
________________________________________________________________________ 
NOTE. GEFT=Field Independence in Figures Identified/Minute as measured by the 
Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT); BAQ=Body Awareness as measured by the 
Body Awareness Questionnaire; APQ=Autonomic Perception as measured by the 
Autonomic Perception Questionnaire; LEAS-A=Emotion Awareness as measured by the 
Levels of Emotion Awareness Scales.   
 
** p≤.01; * p≤ .05 
 
df = (1, 134) for all regressions 
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such that increased autonomic perception predicted increased emotion awareness (t(134) 
= 2.07, p = .034).    
 Data relevant to Hypothesis V is displayed in Tables 4 and 5. Hypothesis V 
proposed that emotion awareness (LEAS-A) was inversely related to overall difficulty 
with emotion regulation (DERS) as well as to the specific subscales tapping impulsivity 
(IMP) and difficulties with goal-directed behavior (GOALS).   Awareness of emotions 
(LEAS-A) did not significantly predict difficulty with emotion regulation (DERS) in 
either a bivariate regression (Table 4), or in a total multivariate regression (Table 5).  It 
did, however, predict impulsivity (IMP) in both the bivariate (t(134) = 2.45, p = .042 
(Table 4)) and multivariate (t(131) = 3.39, p = .004 (Table 5)) regressions as 
hypothesized, and it predicted difficulties with goal-directed behavior (GOALS) (t(131) = 
1.78, p = .034 (Table 5)) in a multivariate regression, also as hypothesized.  The direction 
of the predictions was such that the LEAS-A predicted decreased difficulty with 
impulsivity and goal-directed behavior.   Hypothesis IV was thus partially supported in 
that the LEAS-A predicted the specific subscales suggested by the hypothesis but failed 
to predict the overall measure.  
Exploratory Analyses 
Despite failure of the data to support much of what was hypothesized, and, in 
particular, the concept of a mediational model, several significant and interesting 
relationships were observed upon exploratory analysis.  The results of a multivariate 
linear regression of the DERS and its subscales on all independent variables (GEFT, 
APQ, LEAS, and BAQ) are displayed in Table 5.  The model includes body awareness 
(BAQ) despite its not being a part of the proposed model mediating field dependence/  
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Table 4 
 
Coefficients for Regression of Difficulty with Emotion Regulation (DERS) and DERS 
Subscales on the Level of Emotional Awareness Scales (LEAS-A)   
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Dependent Variable     β     β          r2         p  
                  standard 
                                                                        error  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
DERS             -0.053            0.285                   0.000      0.852  
 
CLA              0.027            0.045            0.003      0.553  
 
STR            -0.017            0.096                    0.000      0.856  
 
AWA            -0.054            0.064                0.005      0.397  
 
IMP            -0.135            0.055                0.042      0.014*  
     
GLS            -0.196            0.152                   0.012      0.197  
 
NAC             0.140            0.084                   0.020      0.093  
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
NOTE. DERS=Difficulties With Emotion Regulation Scales, total score; 
CLA=CLARITY subscale of the DERS; STR=STRATEGIES subscale of the DERS; 
AWA=AWARENESS subscale of the DERS; IMP=IMPULSE subscale of the DERS; 
GLS=GOALS subscale of the DERS; NAC=NONACCEPTANCE subscale of the DERS. 
 
* p≤ .05   
 
df = (1, 134) for all regressions 
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Table 5 
 
Coefficients of Regression and Overall Model Fits for Multivariate Linear Regression 
Models:  DERS and Subscales of DERS Regressed on Independent Variables  (1) Field 
Dependence/Independence (GEFT),  (2) Body Awareness (BAQ), (3) Perception of 
Autonomic Arousal (APQ), and (4) Emotional Awareness (LEAS-A)  
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Model                GEFT              BAQ              APQ            LEAS-A          r2              p                                                                                    
Dependent             β1                   β2                         β3               β4                    
Variable                ∆r2             ∆r2             ∆r2            ∆r2           
                             (p)                 (p)
 
                 (p)             (p)                       
______________________________________________________________________   
 
 DERS             -3.750*            -.141           0.196**           -.370           0.144**      .000 
                           .029    .012  .116             .012            
    (.032)              (.172)            (.000)              (.176)              
     
 
 CLA            -0.690*           -0.033*           0.025**         -0.022           0.126**       .001 
               .039    .025             .121            .002                      
  (.015)               (.049)            (.000)              (.619)             
 
 
 STR            -1.126             -0.022            0.048**          -0.095           0.084*         .015 
                          .023    .002            .061            .007            
   (.066)             (.549)            (.003)               (.322)             
 
 
 AWA           -0.323              -0.062**        -0.001         -0.080      0.061           .068 
              .005    .046  .001               .011          
  (.435)               (.010)            (.943)         (.215)             
 
 
 IMP           0.107            0.001           0.025**       -0.161**      0.096**       .006   
                       .001   .000  .018          .056                      
           (.765)                (.955)             (.007)            (.004)            
        
 
GLS              -1.770           -0.054              0.072**        -0.319*         0.089**        .010 
             .022                 .006   .025            .030 
            (.066)              (.341)               (.004)            (.034)            
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Table 5   Continued 
 
 
NAC             -1.130*             0.005                0.041**        0.080           .111**         .002           
                         .030   .000    .057            .006    
  (.032)              (.882)                (.003)           (.333)             
________________________________________________________________________ 
NOTE. DERS = Difficulties with Emotion Regulation Scales, CLA = CLARITY 
subscale, STR = STRATEGIES subscale, AWA = AWARENESS subscale, IMP = 
IMPULSIVITY subscale, GLS = GOALS subscale, NAC = NONACCEPTANCE 
subscale            
 
** p≤.01; * p≤ .05 
df = (4, 132) for all models 
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independence and emotion regulation difficulty. The rationale for its inclusion comes 
from the literature which inspired this study; specifically that body awareness might be 
related to awareness of autonomic arousal which might, in turn, relate via another 
pathway to emotion regulation. The combination of all four independent variables 
significantly predicted 14.4% of the variance in the overall measure of emotion 
regulation difficulty (DERS) (p = .000).  Two of the independent variables from the 
proposed mediation pathway significantly predicted the DERS:  Increased field 
dependence (decrease in GEFT) significantly predicted an increase in emotion regulation 
difficulty, accounting for 3% of the variance in the DERS above that predicted by the 
other variables (p = .032).  Increased perception of autonomic arousal (APQ) was a 
highly significant predictor of increased emotion regulation difficulty, accounting for 
12% of the variance  in the DERS above that predicted by other variables (t(131) = 3.40, 
p = .000).  The direction of this second prediction is inconsistent with the original 
conception of increased autonomic awareness supporting improved emotion regulation.    
The effects of the independent variables on the subscales of the DERS are also 
displayed in Table 5.   Decreased field independence significantly predicted, in addition 
to the DERS, increased lack of emotional clarity (CLA; t(131) = 2.16, p = .015), and 
increased nonacceptance of emotional responses (NAC; t(131) = 1.87, p = .032). Body 
awareness, not proposed to be a part of the mediational pathway, significantly predicted 
both the Lack of Emotional Clarity subscale (CLA; t(131) =1.66 , p = .049) and the Lack 
of Emotional Awareness subscale (AWA; t(131) = 2.36, p = .010) such that increased 
body awareness predicted increased clarity and awareness of emotions.   
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Perception of autonomic arousal (APQ), which was expected to predict emotion 
awareness (LEAS-A), was a highly significant predictor of not only the DERS, but of all 
subscales with the exception of Lack of Emotional Awareness (AWA). Increased 
perception of arousal predicted an increase in Lack of Emotional Clarity (CLA, t(131)= 
2.72,  p = .004), Limited Access to Emotion Regulation Strategies (STR; t(131) = 2.72  , 
p = .005), Nonacceptance of Emotional Response (NAC; t(131) = 3.17, p = .001), 
increased Impulse Control Difficulties (IMP; t(131) = 1.98, p = 0.025), and increased 
Difficulty Engaging in Goal-Directed Behavior (GLS; t(131) = 1.99, p=.021) (Table 5).  
The APQ showed not only a highly significant direct effect on the emotion regulation 
measure through all but one of its subscales, but it dominated prediction of variability in 
the total DERS measure relative to the other independent variables examined.  The 
percent of variance in each of the subscales predicted by the APQ was, however, low, 
ranging from 1.8% to 12.1% (Table 5). 
The proposed mediational pathway contained variables not directly hypothesized 
to be related to one another.  Nevertheless, relationships among these independent 
variables (GEFT, BAQ, APQ, LEAS ) were explored and  are also displayed in Table 3.  
None of the exploratory regression analyses were significant.    
  
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between field 
dependence/independence and emotion regulation difficulty.  The premise was that such 
a relationship exists and is mediated by awareness of autonomic arousal during emotional 
arousal and by emotion awareness and differentiation. The hypotheses of the overall 
model as well as the mediational steps were based on the empirical literature 
demonstrating many of these individual relationships. The concept of field independence 
as a predictor of emotion regulation was a unique addition to the model.  This was based  
on descriptions in the emotion regulation literature of individuals with good or poor 
emotion regulation which bore qualitative similarities to field independent and field 
dependent individuals. Prominent among these traits was a tendency for field dependent 
individuals to look externally vs. internally for cues when emotionally aroused, and to 
tend more to emotion intensity than emotion accuracy/differentiation.  Independent of the 
mediation pathway, the relationship of baseline body awareness to perception of 
autonomic arousal was examined with the goal of understanding its potential use as an 
intervention for emotion regulation difficulty.  In addition, the relationship between field 
independence and baseline body awareness was examined with the goal of comparing 
this to the field dependence/independence – autonomic perception relationship.   
      Field Dependence/IndependenceAutonomic PerceptionEmotion Awareness Emotion Regulation 
      Field Dependence/IndependenceBaseline Body Awareness 
      Baseline Body Awareness  Autonomic Perception 
 61 
The overall mediational model predicting emotion regulation was not supported.  
However, many individual relationships were found to be significant, and post hoc 
exploratory analysis demonstrated multiple relationships between predictors and 
subscales of the measure of emotion regulation.   
Field dependence/independence, the first step in the mediational model, did not 
significantly predict perception of autonomic arousal.  It did, however, significantly 
predict the final difficulties with emotion regulation measure and two of its subscales, 
lack of emotional clarity and nonacceptance of emotions, such that increased field 
independence predicted improved clarity and acceptance of emotions.   
The first proposed mediator, perception of autonomic arousal, significantly 
predicted the second proposed mediator, emotion awareness/differentiation, in the 
direction hypothesized; that is, increased perception of arousal predicted increased 
emotion awareness/differentiation.  However, it also predicted the emotion regulation 
measure and all but one of its subscales in the direction opposite to that proposed; that is, 
increased perception of autonomic arousal predicted increased difficulty with emotion 
regulation.  
The second proposed mediator, emotion awareness/differentiation, significantly 
predicted two subscales of the emotion regulation measure such that increased awareness 
predicted diminished impulsivity and increased goal-directed behaviors during arousal. 
These predictions were as hypothesized, but emotion awareness/differentiation failed to 
predict the overall measure.  The hypothesized mediation between autonomic arousal and 
emotion awareness was not supported. 
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Finally, field dependence failed to predict baseline body awareness, as it had 
failed to predict perception of autonomic arousal.  However, the hypothesized 
relationship between baseline body awareness and perception of autonomic arousal was 
supported; in addition, baseline body awareness predicted two subscales of the emotion 
regulation measure, such that increased body awareness predicted both increased 
awareness and increased clarity of emotions.   
Perception of Autonomic Arousal 
Contrary to hypothesis, the data demonstrated a highly significant positive 
relationship between perception of autonomic arousal (APQ) and difficultly with emotion 
regulation (DERS).  This is in contrast to the assumption of the study that a high score on 
the APQ would reflect an ability to distinguish and report multiple autonomic sensations 
during experiences of emotional arousal, aiding in emotional awareness.  The 
disconfirmation of this hypothesis regarding the role of autonomic perception, as well as 
the position of the APQ in the mediational model, likely contribute to the overall poor 
model fit. 
  The APQ measure was selected for this study for two reasons:  First, it 
incorporated sensations that had been endorsed for anger, anxiety, and sadness, giving the 
participant a wide range of choices and presumably encouraging individual variability in 
the overall reporting of arousal symptoms. This had been the intention of the authors 
(Shields & Simon, 1991).  Secondly, it had been used in conjunction with the BAQ to 
evaluate the relationship between baseline body awareness and awareness of bodily 
symptoms during arousal in an earlier study (Shields & Simon, 1991). This gave us the 
opportunity to replicate their findings as well as to examine the role of baseline body 
 63 
awareness in emotion regulation.  A comparison of the results of the present study with 
those of the 1991 study are displayed in Table 6.  Although means and standard 
deviations for baseline body awareness are similar in the two studies, there is a 
statistically significant difference in the mean values of autonomic perception (t(101) = 
4.37, p <. 001). Correlation coefficients between the BAQ and the APQ were positive for 
both studies.     
Both studies used undergraduate participants; however, the 1991 study sample 
was 70% female while the present study sample was 91% female.  Both men and women 
in the 1991 study scored higher on the APQ (mean scores 139.8, 153.9) than the overall 
sample in the present study where the scores were not separated by gender due to the low 
percentage of male participants. In both instances, the target emotion was anger.  The 
discrepancy in scores might be explained by differences in the method of administration:  
Both studies queried participants with the statement, “When I feel angry …,” but the 
1991 study asked participants to write a brief description of an instance of anger prior to 
answering this question.  During the present study, participants were simply asked to 
think of an instance of anger prior to answering; the writing step was eliminated during 
the present study in order to minimize the number of times during the session that 
participants were required to write about feelings, but it may have accounted for the 
decrease in overall intensity of symptom report relative to the earlier study.  The Shields 
& Simon study provides no more specific information than total scores, so it is  
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Table  6   
Comparison of BAQ and APQ Results With Those From Shields & Simon ( 1991) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Study             N                  Mean APQ(SD)               Mean BAQ(SD)                  r2   
                                                                                        
Present        136          133(33)                            83(14.5)                           6.3%   
Study 
 
1991            245                  150(33)                             82(15.0)                          5.8%  
Study   
 
________________________________________________________________________             
NOTE.  APQ = Autonomic Perception Questionnaire, BAQ = Body Awareness 
Questionnaire 
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impossible to know if the effects of this writing were on number or intensity of 
symptoms.      
The prediction of increased rather than decreased emotion regulation difficulty by 
the APQ may be explained by the observation that a total score on the APQ reflects a 
combination of both the number and the intensity of sensations reported.   A high score 
could be achieved by an individual who is able to distinguish and identify multiple 
sensations.  This had been the expectation of this study.   However, such a score might 
reflect autonomic “flooding” in an individual who experiences intense arousal leading to 
indiscriminate reporting of symptoms.  The former might lead to emotional awareness 
and improved regulation, while the latter might lead to interference with cognitive 
processing.  This might lead to impaired regulation due to difficulty sorting out and 
identifying feelings or to impaired judgment and control. Finally, individuals 
experiencing “numbing” or suppression of emotion might receive low scores which mask 
their actual level or number of symptoms. 
Witkin’s original conceptualization of field independence correlated it with 
increased attentiveness to internal signals (Witkin et al., 1971).  The APQ measure as 
utilized in this study does not distinguish attentiveness to internal signals from perception 
of internal signals.  Analysis of the APQ data showed that higher scores were not 
correlated with the number of symptoms endorsed, but with the average intensity rating 
for each symptom (t(134) = 9, r = .57, p = .000).  Thus individuals with higher APQ 
scores tended to endorse feeling symptoms more intensely but did not necessarily report 
significantly more symptoms than individuals with overall lower scores.    
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In the present study, only one emotion, anger, was queried on the APQ measure in 
the interests of limiting the length of the test sessions. Had the measure been 
administered in such a way as to assess responses to multiple emotions, for example if the 
study had queried responses to fear, sadness, and anger independently, more information 
might have been gathered. In such a case, the hypothesis that autonomic flooding, not 
sensory discrimination, significantly predicts high scores on this measure would be 
supported if symptom profiles for all three emotions were more similar for high scorers 
than for low scorers.   
Field dependence/independence and perception of autonomic arousal.  That field 
dependence/independence failed to show a relationship to perception of autonomic 
arousal may be more understandable in light of the APQ results.  That field independence 
was a significant independent predictor of overall improved emotion regulation as well as 
increased emotional clarity and acceptance, albeit predicting a small amount of variance 
for each (2.9% for DERS, 3.9% for CLA, 3.0% for NONACC) suggests that there may be 
multiple paths to the emotion regulation process. Witkin’s original differentiation 
hypothesis of field independence suggests that attention to and differentiation of somatic 
information is only one facet of this cognitive style that categorizes and differentiates 
information from all sources (Witkin et al, 1979). Although the present study failed to 
capture the possible somatic connection between field independence and emotion 
regulation, the direct relationship between the two variables suggests the possibility of a 
more cognitive mechanism that operates independently of the evaluation of somatic 
information to promote emotion regulation.  This is discussed below when the literature 
on executive attention is addressed.   
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The specific subscales predicted by field independence in this study may be 
indicative of how emotions are affected:  Diminished non-acceptance of emotions 
(“When I’m upset, I feel guilty….,” ”When I’m upset, I feel ashamed”) may suggest that 
field independence is accompanied by overall lower emotionality, given that these non-
acceptance terms imply the negative appraisal and judgment that often accompany 
heightened negative emotion.  Alternatively, diminished non-acceptance may imply 
better ability to differentiate between having an emotion and judgments of self-worth, a 
skill more cognitive in nature.  Better clarity of emotions (“I have difficulty making sense 
out of my feelings,” “I have no idea how I am feeling”) suggests an ability to categorize 
and differentiate information, consistent with Witkin’s description of the construct.    
Perception of autonomic arousal and emotion awareness/differentiation. 
 Increased autonomic perception (APQ) simultaneously predicted increased regulation 
difficulty (DERS) and increased emotional awareness (LEAS-A); a higher score on the 
LEAS-A in turn predicted diminished impulsivity (IMP), and diminished difficulties with 
goal-directed behaviors (GLS), two components of improved regulation.  The 
relationship between increased APQ score, if it is interpreted in this study as reflecting an 
undifferentiated intense perception of arousal symptoms, and increased emotion 
awareness/differentiation, is inconsistent with the findings of Feldman Barrett et al. 
(2001), which suggested that, in a given individual, increased emotional intensity is 
associated with less emotion differentiation. Although this study originally hypothesized 
the APQ/LEAS-A relationship, the assumption had been that high APQ indicated 
differentiation of somatic symptoms.  The inconsistency can best be explained in light of 
the very small percent of LEAS-A variance predicted by the APQ ( 3% ), such that the 
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APQ may slightly influence emotional awareness while also reflecting increased 
emotional/arousal intensity (leading to worse regulation) .     
Emotion Awareness/Differentiation and Emotion Regulation 
 The LEAS-A was a highly significant independent negative predictor of both the 
impulse control difficulties (IMP) and difficulties with goal-directed behaviors (GLS) 
subscales of the DERS, as hypothesized.  That the LEAS-A failed to better predict the 
DERS was initially surprising.  The LEAS-A was selected based on literature studies 
which had demonstrated a positive relationship between precise mood labeling and the 
ability to regulate emotion  (Feldman Barrett et al., 2001; Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1996; 
Shweder, 1993). However, the only two subscales predicted by the LEAS-A were those 
suggesting utilization of various behavioral responses to emotion, consistent with the 
premise of the authors mentioned here that naming an emotion enables recognition of 
strategies for dealing with it  (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; 
Shweder, 1993).. The prediction of only these two subscales is thus not unreasonable and 
suggests that precise labeling of emotions may enable one of multiple routes to emotion 
regulation.     
A final concern with the LEAS-A was with its length and the effort required to 
provide handwritten descriptions of emotional responses to 10 scenarios. Although the 
measure was originally written with 20 scenarios, it is increasingly used in 10-item form, 
likely due to the effort required by the scorer as well as participants.  The fact that the 
measure predicted only impulsivity in bivariate regression caused concerns about 
validity; specifically that impulsive participants possibly did not take the time to express 
emotion differentiation, thus the measure might simply assess impulsivity.  The LEAS-A 
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gained some credibility when it significantly predicted, additionally, the Difficulties with 
Goal Directed Behaviors (GLS) subscale, as hypothesized, in a multivariate regression.      
Body Awareness 
There was no a priori reason to include body awareness in the mediational model, 
since the literature better suggested a relationship between field dependence/ 
independence and somatic awareness when aroused than between field 
dependence/independence and baseline body awareness (Parkes, 1981). Our results 
neither supported nor refuted this hypothesis since field dependence/independence failed 
to predict either baseline body awareness or perception of arousal.  We had chosen to 
include body awareness in the present study, however, due to questions raised about the 
methods of integrated mindfulness meditation training; specifically whether it is the 
increased mindfulness, learned through focus on body awareness that is useful, or 
whether it is the increased body awareness itself that is somehow related to self-
regulation.   
Body awareness and perception of arousal were positively correlated, but they 
nonetheless showed different directions in the prediction of emotion regulation subscales.  
If the intensity of autonomic symptoms which may in large part underlie high APQ 
scores is detrimental to emotion regulation, the BAQ might likewise have been expected 
to predict disregulation.  The discrepant predictions are explained by the small percentage 
variance in the APQ predicted by the BAQ.  This suggests the APQ score reflects an 
element of attention to body sensations when aroused in addition to a component of 
disruptive intensity of arousal.  In trying to understand the correlation between the BAQ 
and the APQ, it seems unlikely that increased body awareness produced increased 
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perception of autonomic arousal, but more likely that those individuals predisposed to 
intense autonomic arousal become generally more attentive to body signals overall. 
The independent prediction of increased clarity and awareness of emotion by increased 
body awareness suggests a path to emotion regulation independent of those predicted by 
either emotional awareness or field dependence.  This begins to address one of our 
original questions; specifically whether the body awareness or mindfulness components 
of integrative meditation training are effective in self-regulation.  Thus, it suggests that 
body awareness itself contributes to emotion regulation.  Of note, the awareness of 
emotion subscale contains 4 items that ask about baseline body states and only two that 
ask about aroused states; the items in this subscale also assess purposeful attention to 
feelings.    
Theoretical Perspectives 
The observations of this study suggest that a small but significant direct 
relationship exists between field independence and emotion regulation that is unrelated to 
somatic signals and awareness.  This observation begs re-examination of the literature on 
the cognitive processes related to field independence and the regulatory correlates of 
some of these processes.  This might indicate possible mechanisms underlying this 
relationship. 
The suggestion that a cognitive style known to influence perception/organization 
of neutral information somehow affects emotion regulation is curious.  The field 
dependence/ independence construct was chosen for examination because of similarities 
in the emotion regulation literature between those with regulation difficulties and those 
characterized as field dependent; primary among these is the tendency to look outward 
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for cues in the face of emotional arousal, and the tendency to be more aware of emotion 
intensity than emotion accuracy, i.e. to know how intensely one feels, but not to know 
precisely how one feels (Blascovich, 1990, 1992; Larsen & Diener, 1987; Mesquita & 
Frijda, 1992; Schwarz & Clore, 1983).  These traits suggest the opposite of the cognitive/ 
perceptual field independent style of categorizing information and attending to internal 
signals. 
Executive attention.  Field dependence/independence has been related to aspects 
of attention in the context of education and academic functioning.  Field independence 
has been found to relate to attention in children; Guisande et al. (2007) observed that field 
independent children demonstrated improved working memory, attentional focus and 
shift, and sustained attention, relative to intermediate or field dependent children.  Stoner 
& Glynn (1987) observed that children diagnosed with ADHD were found to be field 
dependent relative to normals.  
In the past two decades, interest in attention has grown significantly independent 
of its relationship to education and learning, and relative to its impact on emotion 
processing. The conceptual model of human attention posited by Posner & Petersen 
(1990) is widely utilized and describes three primary components of attention which 
include orienting, alerting, and detecting, and which are linked to separable brain regions.  
While the orienting and alerting functions pertain to selective attention and sustained 
focus, the “detecting” function, now referred to as executive attention, was initially 
described as “reporting the presence of a target event.” This function is also described as 
“evaluation of error,” or “stimulus-response selection in the face of competing streams of 
information” (Bush et al., 2000).  Executive attention is differentiated from other forms in 
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that it describes a state in which the individual is not only alert and attentive, but also 
engaged in processing and selecting as well (Posner et al. , 1980).   
Executive attention has received considerable interest in the developmental 
literature and is related to the emergence of self-regulation which is in turn related to 
emotionality, delay of gratification, compliance, and general adjustment (Eisenberg et al., 
2004).   Functions associated with the executive attention network overlap with the more 
general domain of executive function in childhood; this also includes working memory, 
planning, switching, and inhibitory control (Welch, 2001).  Using this overlap, cognitive 
tasks assessing executive attention in adults, generally involving adult reading and word 
skills, are adapted to children (Rueda et al., 2005).  Attention thus assessed has 
consistently been related to effortful control of behavior; Rothbart et al (1994) showed 
that children high in effortful control were low in aggressiveness, and Eisenberg et al 
(1994) observed that children with good attentional control tended to use nonhostile 
verbal methods to deal with anger rather than overt aggression.    
Executive attention has been divided into cognitive and affective components 
which appear to have different neurological substrates.  Increasing evidence suggests that 
these separable circuits have a connection of mutual inhibitory feedback such that 
increased activity in the circuitry supporting the cognitive aspect of executive attention 
contributes to diminished activity in the circuitry supporting the affective aspect of 
executive attention and vice versa.  Multiple sources of information, including meta-
analyses of functional imagine data, suggest that the circuitry supporting executive 
attention is localized to the anterior cingulate cortex (Drevets & Raichie,1998; Mayberg 
et al., 1999; Posner et al., 2007; Whalen et al., 1998). fMRI studies of this region have 
 73 
demonstrated that Stroop-like tasks involving neutral words cause activation in the dorsal 
(cognitive) portion of the anterior cingulate while Stroop-like tasks involving emotion-
laden words cause activation of the ventral (affective) portion of the anterior cingulate.  
Executive attention and emotion.  Drevets & Raichie (1998), in an extensive 
review, discuss the implications of these findings on the cognitive effects of intense 
emotion.  They present a heuristic perspective, suggesting that an intense emotional 
response to threat, which generates rapid, automatic, potentially lifesaving responses, 
may suppress the slower semantic processing involved in reasoning through alternative 
courses of action.  Similarly, in severely depressed patients, blood flow is increased to the 
emotion-related prefrontal and limbic areas.  It was observed that depressed individuals 
with cognitive impairment exhibit diminished blood flow to the dorsal anterior cingulate 
(cognitive circuitry) whereas those without cognitive impairment do not (Bench et al., 
1992; Drevets et al., 1992).    
 The direct relationship between executive attention and field independence has 
only been addressed in the education/child developmental literature, as described above; 
these are few in number, largely due to the difficulty of directly assessing executive 
attention in young children.  The indirect relationship between these two constructs as 
they relate to this study was first noted in the literature with observations that meditation 
has been linked to both field independence and executive attention.   
Meditation, attention, and field independence.  Meditation has been correlated 
with improvement in multiple aspects of attention.  Chan & Woollacott (2007) observed 
increased executive attention (ability to inhibit incorrect responses) in individuals who 
practiced regular meditation.  Tang et al. (2007) demonstrated that as little as five days of 
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integrative body-mind training produced significant increases in executive attention, 
while Brefczynski-Lewis et al. (2007) and Jha et al. (2007) found changes in multiple 
aspects of attention in groups practicing concentration or mindfulness meditation.  If 
meditation is the practice of filtering out and decreasing attention to unwanted thoughts, 
the process of meditation practice sounds, conceptually, like a rehearsal of executive 
attention skills.  
Meditation and relaxation techniques have also been associated with changes in 
field independence.  For example, transcendental meditation produced significant 
increases in field independence in children (Linden, 1973), high school students (So & 
Orme-Johnson, 2001), and adults (Sridevi & Krishna Rao, 2003).  Increased field 
independence was also observed in college students practicing yoga  (Sridevi & Krishna 
Rao, 2000);   and in a group of college students practicing mixed methods of meditation 
(Fergussen, 1992).  
The associations between certain aspects of attention and both meditative practice 
and field independence suggest that some aspects of meditation enable increased ability 
to evaluate and inhibit responses, and that these skills may be related to increased field 
independence.  This might suggest a reframing of the concept of differentiation which is 
at the core of the field dependence/independence construct.  Perhaps, for example, the 
ability to differentiate one’s own internal signals from external cues (field independence) 
might be interpreted as the ability to inhibit attention to these external cues (executive 
attention) in favor of attending to internal signals.   Either concept might be related to 
emotion regulation using the reciprocity model of cognition and emotion in the anterior 
cingulate cortex.  Thus the effects of increased field independence or executive attention 
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on emotion regulation may be due to increased activity in the circuits subserving 
cognitive functions and thus inhibition of activity in the emotion-related circuitry.  
The Present Study 
The results of this study are consistent with such a model in that field 
independence was an independent, if very minor, predictor of emotion regulation.      
They suggest, in addition, that there may be multiple routes to emotion regulation, given 
that baseline body awareness, verbal expression of emotion differentiation, and field 
independence were all independent predictors of emotion regulation.   
Results of the present study also address, in a small way, the original question of 
whether the mindfulness or body awareness aspects of integrated mindfulness therapy, in 
particular the MBSR model, is operative in emotion regulation.  The results suggest that 
simple body awareness enhancement might be useful in facilitating certain aspects of 
emotion regulation.  However, there are no studies known to this author which examine 
the extent to which integrated meditation practice, which employs the body scan or 
similar techniques and is shown to produce the cognitive changes described above, 
improves baseline body awareness.    
Limitations of the study and future directions.  Although many relationships were 
significantly predicted by the data in this study, effect sizes were consistently very small.  
This suggests that there are other factors influencing emotion regulation which we were 
unable to address in the current study.  In addition, the use of undergraduate participants 
on weekend afternoons could be a contributing factor to increase measurement error due 
to less than optimal effort on the measures, as participation was not voluntary but 
required for course credit.  For example, some participants in the earlier (noon Saturday) 
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sessions acknowledged having slept until 15 minutes before the scheduled time.  Some 
participants appeared to hurry through the sessions; there was a trend toward shortened 
sessions as the end of semester approached, possibly suggesting that these late dates 
selected for individuals who were either less invested or less interested in their 
performance.   
 In addition, the choice of measures may have introduced some error variance.  
Clearly, the selection of the APQ as a measure to assess the ability to distinguish somatic 
symptoms during arousal was a primary weakness of the study.  Whether field 
dependence/independence predicts perception of autonomic arousal, and whether 
perception of autonomic arousal predicts emotion awareness/differentiation was, thus, not 
adequately addressed and remains a subject worthy of study. There is a consensus in the 
literature on the difficulty with self-report measures of autonomic arousal, and the idea 
that reporting of symptoms is affected by beliefs about these symptoms and emotions 
(Blascovich & Katkin, 1983; Pennebaker & Skelton, 1981).  Given that Parkes (1981) 
observed a correlation between field independence and the ability to differentiate 
depression from anxiety in an inpatient population, a better approach in the present study 
would have been to assess responses to fear, anger, and sadness separately, looking for 
discrepancies in the symptom profiles as evidence of differentiation.   
 The field dependence/ independence measure (GEFT) may have been sensitive to 
state anxiety in some participants. The measure was timed, administered in a group 
setting, and was challenging.  The literature on the measure has suggested that its 
administration has caused distress in other studies (Witkin et al., 1971).  The measure 
was administered at the end of the session for this reason.  The participant pool for the 
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present study was dominated by a mixture of Caucasian and African American students 
with a few Latino and Asian participants as well.  The literature has demonstrated that 
ethnic minority students’ test performance in an academic setting may be diminished by 
their stereotypical expectations of being outperformed by their Caucasian peers (Blair & 
Banaji, 1996; Spicer, 2000).  Participants in the present study were arranged in the room 
such that they could not see one another, and those who finished before the deadline were 
asked to simply quietly raise their hands. The situation was nonetheless timed and for 
some, likely stressful. In addition, it was administered in a classroom/academic setting.  
This concern is noted because the examiner, who scored the measures 
immediately following sessions, made the casual anecdotal observation that participants 
scoring high in field independence often displayed traits of extraversion, i.e. they spoke 
more to the examiner and to other participants during breaks and after the session.  
Alternatively, those participants who were quieter may have simply been more anxious 
and may thus have been somewhat impaired on the timed test.  Ethnicity was not 
recorded or controlled for in the present study.  The measure is routinely administered in 
groups, but literature on the effects of group composition on administration of the GEFT 
is not known to this writer.  Although the Embedded Figures Test correlates well with the 
Rod and Frame Test for field independence, it carries the disadvantage that the 
participant is generally somewhat aware of his performance.   Because this is not true for 
the Rod and Frame Test, it is likely a superior tool for the assessment of field 
dependence/independence.  Individual session administration of the GEFT would be a 
second choice; although participants are aware of their own performance, the sense of 
comparison to others is minimized. 
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Given the network of relationships described in the literature between executive 
attention, meditation, and field independence, and given the results of this study relating 
field independence to emotion regulation, future work might focus on investigating this 
relationship.  For example a simple cross-sectional study examining field dependence, 
executive attention, and emotion regulation might be productive and further enhance the 
current understanding of emotion regulation and its underlying processes.  In addition, a 
comparison of concentration or breathing meditation and non-meditative body awareness 
training might shed some light on the exact differences produced by these interventions.  
Both behavioral and neuroimaging approaches might be useful for such a study.   
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Appendix A 
 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) 
 
Please indicate how often the following statements apply to you by writing the 
appropriate number from the scale below on the line beside each item:  
________________________________________________________________________ 
   1----------------------2-------------------------3----------------------4-----------------------5        
almost never       sometimes          about half the time    most of the time      almost always        
(0-10%)               (11-35%)                   (36-65%)                  (66-90%)            (91-100%)  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
______    1) I am clear about my feelings. 
______    2) I pay attention to how I feel.  
______    3) I experience my emotions as overwhelming and out of control.  
______    4) I have no idea how I am feeling.  
______    5) I have difficulty making sense out of my feelings.  
______    6) I am attentive to my feelings. 
______    7) I know exactly how I am feeling.  
______    8) I care about what I am feeling.  
______    9) I am confused about how I feel. 
______    10) When I’m upset, I acknowledge my emotions. 
______    11) When I’m upset, I become angry with myself for feeling that way.  
______    12) When I’m upset, I become embarrassed for feeling that way.  
______    13) When I’m upset, I have difficulty getting work done.  
______    14) When I’m upset, I become out of control.  
______    15) When I’m upset, I believe that I will remain that way for a long time.  
______    16) When I’m upset, I believe that I’ll end up feeling very depressed.  
______    17) When I’m upset, I believe that my feelings are valid and important. 
______    18) When I’m upset, I have difficulty focusing on other things. 
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Appendix A continued 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 1-------------------------2---------------------3----------------------4-----------------------5        
almost never        sometimes       about half the time   most of the time    almost always        
(0-10%)                  (11-35%)             (36-65%)               (66-90%)              (91-100%)  
______________________________________________________________________ 
______    19) When I’m upset, I feel out of control.  
______    20) When I’m upset, I can still get things done.  
______    21) When I’m upset, I feel ashamed with myself for feeling that way. 
______    22) When I’m upset, I know that I can find a way to eventually feel better. 
______    23) When I’m upset, I feel like I am weak.  
______    24) When I’m upset, I feel like I can remain in control of my behaviors. 
______    25) When I’m upset, I feel guilty for feeling that way. 
______    26) When I’m upset, I have difficulty concentrating.  
______    27) When I’m upset, I have difficulty controlling my behaviors.  
______    28) When I’m upset, I believe that there is nothing I can do to make myself 
                       feel better.  
______    29) When I’m upset, I become irritated with myself for feeling that way. 
______    30) When I’m upset, I start to feel very bad about myself. 
______    31) When I’m upset, I believe that wallowing in it is all I can do. 
______    32) When I’m upset, I lose control over my behaviors.  
______    33) When I’m upset, I have difficulty thinking about anything else.  
______    34) When I’m upset, I take time to figure out what I’m really feeling. 
______    35) When I’m upset, it takes me a long time to feel better.  
______    36) When I’m upset, my emotions feel overwhelming. 
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                                                 Appendix B 
                                        Body Awareness Questionnaire (BAQ) 
 
A number of statements which people may feel are more or less true about themselves  
are given below.  Read each statement and then, in the space to the left of the item, write the 
number which best describes how true the statement is of you.  There are no right or wrong 
answers.  The best answer is the one which honestly reflects the degree to which the statement 
fits your own experience.  Use the following scale: 
 
       1                2                3                4                5                6                7 
 
      Not at all                                         Neutral                                          Very true 
   true about me               about me 
 
 
____ 1.  I notice differences in the way my body reacts to various foods. 
____  2.  I can always tell when I bump myself whether or not it will become a bruise. 
____  3.  I always know when I’ve exerted myself to the point where I’ll be sore the next 
               day. 
____  4.  I am always aware of changes in my energy level when I eat certain foods. 
____  5.  I know in advance when I’m getting the flu. 
____  6.  I know I’m running a fever without taking my temperature. 
____  7.  I can distinguish between tiredness due to hunger and tiredness due to lack of sleep. 
____  8.  I can accurately predict what time of day lack of sleep will catch up with me. 
____  9.  I am aware of a cycle in my activity level throughout the day. 
____10.  I don’t notice seasonal rhythms and cycles in the way my body functions. 
____11.  As soon as I wake up in the morning I know how much energy I’ll have during the day. 
____12.  I can tell when I go to bed how well I will sleep that night. 
____13.  I notice distinct body reactions when I am fatigued. 
____14.  I notice specific body responses to changes in the weather. 
____15.  I can predict how much sleep I will need at night in order to wake up refreshed. 
____16.  When my exercise habits change, I can predict very accurately how that change will 
                             affect my energy level. 
____17.  There seems to be a “best” time for me to go to sleep at night. 
____18.  I notice specific bodily reactions to being over-hungry. 
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Appendix C 
 
Autonomic Perception Questionnaire – Revised (APQ-R) 
 
Please indicate how true each of the following statements is about you by writing the 
appropriate number from the scale below on the line beside each item: 
 
 
    1------------2-----------3-----------4----------5-----------6-----------7-----------8-----------9 
Not at all true           Neutral,              Very true 
about me         not sure               about me 
 
When I feel angry….. 
 
_____   1.  My face becomes hot. 
_____    2.  My hands become cold. 
_____    3.  I perspire. 
_____    4.  My mouth becomes dry. 
_____    5.  I am aware of increased muscle tension in my body 
_____    6.  I get a headache. 
_____    7.  I breathe more shallowly. 
_____    8.  I feel my heart beat faster. 
_____    9.  The intensity of my heartbeat increases. 
_____  10.  I am often aware of changes in my breathing. 
_____  11.  My breathing becomes more rapid. 
_____  12.  I am aware of changes in my heart action. 
_____  13.  I feel as if blood is rushing to my head. 
_____  14.  I get a lump in my throat or a choked-up feeling. 
_____  15.  My stomach gets upset. 
_____  16.  I get a sinking or heavy feeling in my stomach. 
_____  17.  I have difficulty talking. 
_____  18.  I feel cold or chilly. 
_____  19.  My eyes get moist or watery. 
_____  20.  I experience a dulling of my senses. 
_____  21.  I become weak and shaky on my feet. 
_____  22.  I get nauseated. 
_____  23.  My palms get sweaty. 
_____  24.  I get restless. 
_____  25.  I urinate more frequently or have the urge to urinate more frequently. 
_____  26.  My face feels cold and pale. 
_____  27.  I get a heavy feeling or knotin my chest. 
_____  28.  I get goosebumps. 
_____  29.  I feel faint or dizzy. 
_____  30.  I get a fluttering, light feeling in my chest. 
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Appendix D 
 
Levels of Emotional Awareness Scales (LEAS-A) 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Please describe what you would feel in the following situations.  The only requirement is that you 
use the word “feel” in your answers.  You may make your answers as brief or as long as 
necessary to express how you would feel.  In each situation there is another person mentioned.  
Please indicate how you think that other person would feel as well. 
 
1. A neighbor asks you to repair a piece of furniture.  As the neighbor looks on,   
you begin hammering the nail but then miss the nail and hit your finger.  How would you 
feel?  How would the neighbor feel? 
 
2. A loved one gives you a back rub after you return from a hard day’s work.  How would 
you feel?  How would your partner feel? 
 
3. As you drive over a suspension bridge you see a person standing on the other side of the 
guardrail, looking down at the water.  How would you feel?  How would the person feel? 
 
4. Your boss tells you that your work has been unacceptable and needs to be improved.  
How would you feel?  How would your boss feel? 
 
5. You are standing in line at the bank.  The person in front of you steps up to the window 
and begins a very complicated transaction.  How would you feel?  How would the person 
in front of you feel? 
 
6. You have been working hard on a project for several months.  Several days after 
submitting it, your boss stops by to tell you that your work was excellent.  How would 
you feel?  How would your boss feel? 
 
7. Your dentist has told you that you have several cavities and schedules you for a return 
visit.  How would you feel?  How would the dentist feel? 
 
8. Your doctor told you to avoid fatty foods.  A new colleague at work calls you to say that 
she/he is going out for pizza and invites you to go along.  How would you feel?  How 
would your colleague feel? 
 
9. You and a friend agree to invest money together to begin a new business venture.  
Several days later you call the friend back only to learn that she/he changed her/his mind.  
How would you feel?  How would your friend feel? 
 
10. You fall in love with someone who is both attractive and intelligent.  Although this 
person is not well off financially, this doesn’t matter to you—your income is adequate.  
When you begin to discuss marriage, you learn that she/he is actually from an extremely 
wealthy family.  She/he did not want that known for fear that people would only be 
interested in her/him for her/his money.  How would you feel?  How would she/he feel? 
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